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Chapter 6

Studying Injustice in the Macro and Micro Spheres: Four Generations of Social Psychological Research

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Introduction

This chapter examines the theoretical development and application of justice research in three generations of psychologists trained in the Lewinian mode of psychological research: Morton Deutsch, a student of Kurt Lewin's while at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Susan Opatow, a student of Deutsch's while at Teachers College, Columbia University; and Sara I. McClelland, a student of Opatow's while at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Within each of these scholars' work – and in the links that connect them – we see how justice theories shift and expand when applied to a range of situations and across levels of analysis. Moving between macro-level structures and micro-level relationships, we explore nuances of justice research models and discover new aspects of justice theories.

This close genealogical read begins with Lewin's interest in shaping and changing social norms, particularly norms that may be unfair but have come to be seen as inevitable, fair, and individually chosen. Lewin's interest in how injustice can be experienced, yet, at the same time, normalized and unacknowledged, remains a compelling and contemporary topic. All four scholars – Lewin, Deutsch, Opatow, and McClelland – share an interest in how injustice shapes the everyday experience of individuals and groups. While focused on the scholarly lineage connecting these four scholars, we recognize that others are doing similar work. Lewin's ideas have traveled many routes and have inspired a variety of compelling research strategies. We are grateful for the many kindred scholars doing exciting social justice research from this Lewinian lineage. To mention just a few notable scholars working within this tradition: Michelle Fine's work on disparities in educational opportunities across race and class (Fine, 1991; Fine et al., 2004) and participatory action research studies with women in prison (Fine et al., 2003; Fine & Torre, 2006); Janice

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Steil's work on power, intimacy, entitlement, relationships (1994, 1997, 2001); and Francine Deutsch's work on gender equity at home, in the labor market, and its effects on women's well-being (1999). We also mention Julie Blackman's (1989) work on violence and Jeffrey Z. Rubin's (Rubin & Levinger, 1995) on levels of analysis. These scholars, all students of Morton Deutsch, exemplify the breadth and depth of scholarship that have emerged from the Lewinian tradition and Morton Deutsch's mentorship.

In this chapter we narrow our focus on the Lewin-Deutsch-Opatow-McClelland lineage to explore how academic ideas emerge, flourish, and change as socio-political conditions evoke and extend earlier theories. In the spirit of research on the study of lives (McAdams, 2001; Ouellette & Frost, 2006) we trace the development of scholarship linked by mentorship, a shared focus on the role of injustice in the everyday, and the role that psychology can play in reversing injustice.

The four of us are linked by academic lineage, but also by the socio-political conditions of our lives. Bourdieu (1977) has argued that a crisis is often required to break the taken for granted structure of norms. This "exogenous shock" reveals the arbitrariness of social divisions that persist all around us. With this in mind, we note that a shared reality cuts across our lives over the course of the past century. We each began our graduate training during times of international stress, conflict, and moral exclusion. Born in 1890, Lewin was a Jew who moved from Poland to Berlin with his family when he was 15. He completed his dissertation in 1914 with Carl Stumpf and, until 1933, was associated with Gestalt Psychology at the Institute for Social Research in Germany. In the period leading up to World War II when the National Socialist Party ("Nazi") gained power, Lewin faced extreme prejudice, resulting in his emigration to the United States in 1933. Deutsch describes his start in social psychology in relationship to World War II: "I got involved in graduate work shortly after the [atomic] bomb exploded, I . . . turned to the theoretical analysis of what I thought were basic social relations that relate to war and peace" (Roe, Wessells, & McKay, 2006, p. 312). Opatow's personal and academic roots were in the aftermath of WWII and the Vietnam War. Perhaps not coincidentally, McClelland began her graduate training in 2003, the same year that the Second Gulf War began.

Three wars over a 60 year period loosely tie these four lives together, but perhaps more important than the wars themselves is the recognition that contemporary socio-political events influence the lives and interests of academics – particularly those that go on to study prejudice, inequality, and injustice. In our scholarship we have taken up questions of conflict and fairness with an eye towards the ways that injustice becomes normalized and conditions of inequity come to be described as natural. We each focus on macro and micro contexts to examine how the naturalization and denaturalization of injustice travels between these contexts. At this intersection, research methods and theory become increasingly important tools to de-naturalize injustice, but these tools must also be continually examined for their limitations and the assumptions they import into the research environment.

To explore the links that have emerged from the Lewinian lineage, this chapter explores two central questions about conducting justice research. First, when considering distributive justice and especially the fair distribution of resources, how do

we define *fair*? Second, what are the strengths and limits of the distributive justice paradigm as it moves among smaller and larger social units? We explore these questions by examining how the distributive justice paradigm has been interpreted in psychological research, how Deutsch's ideas have been translated into innovative research designs, and the challenges that face researchers working in this area. Using a recent empirical example of using a justice framework to study intimate relationships (McClelland, 2010, in press), we explore how these ideas have been instrumental in forming new research questions and, of course, new challenges that accompany these questions. We look simultaneously at the history and future of justice research to emphasize the power of theorizing and studying issues of structural injustice across societal, group, familial, and intimate levels of analysis.

Kurt Lewin: How Individuals and Groups Come to View Their World

Lewin is often described as the father of social psychology, but he also was influential in the development of the field of justice research. His book, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (Lewin, 1948) contains many theoretical essays related to conflict, justice, and prejudice. When considering the role of injustice, Lewin was interested in examining how experiences of injustice affected both individuals and groups. In defining the "life space" (p. 868) Lewin (1939) was interested in subjective experience of individuals, but he was also interested in how the objective environment interacted with the person to create that subjective experience.

In his posthumously published essay "Everything within me rebels" (1933/1986) (written in Berlin but never sent to Wolfgang Kohler because the safety of sender and receiver could have been compromised), Lewin described what life was like for Jewish children living in Germany during the early 20th century. In this short essay, Lewin keenly observed individual, group, and nationalistic psychological experiences – all within small acts of injustice that had become mundane, expected, and relentless. He wrote,

Quite suddenly and without any kind of predictable cause, [children] have been beaten up and treated with contempt. Whether instigated by teachers, by students, or simply by people in the street, these recurring experiences pull the ground out from under the feet of the young child, and cut off all possibility of objective discussion or unbiased evaluation . . . Thus, the effects are ever present (p. 42).

Lewin's observations about the effects of recurring and ever present, violently enacted prejudice foreshadow his research on how interior and exterior effects of prejudice interact. This short quote is conceptually rich and highlights Lewin's attention to the role of groups (teachers, students, people on the street), the role of social attitudes (contempt, bias), and the negative effects on the individual – both in terms of the physical body and their psychological well-being. Like many Jewish émigrés of his generation, Lewin was concerned with pressing social problems that

demanded attention and solutions. This led him to develop and encourage participatory action research in concert with field studies, research in naturalistic settings, and research with applicable outcomes. His work pioneered the use of social action groups as an approach to social justice research; he believed that such an approach could foster the development of socially-relevant theory and guide action (Lewin, 1948).

Lewin believed that individual and group behaviors could not be explained without a parallel understanding of how individuals and groups come to view the world in which they live. Lewin was an early advocate for group-level research and argued that groups experienced norms and patterns that were not simply reducible to the individuals within the group (Sarup, 1975). Deutsch (1954) provided important commentary that explained what this perspective meant within the discipline of psychology:

It is well to recognize that Lewin's first writings in the area of group dynamics . . . occurred at a time when psychologists commonly denied the existence of "groups." Only "individuals" were real, and to refer to characteristics of groups – e.g., "group atmosphere," "group goals," etc. – was viewed as being "nonscientific" or "mystical." One of Lewin's major contributions was to help [make] the concept of *group* acceptable to psychologists, that is, to lead psychologists to accept the notion that groups, per se, have characteristics (pp. 213–214, cited in Sarup, 1975, p. 760).

Lewin's interest in groups extended to all types and sizes of groups. One example of a group he examined at length was the marital dyad in his chapter, "The background of conflict in marriage" (1948). This early interest in dyadic relationships helped to launch research on inter-personal relationships in social psychology (e.g., Berscheid & Peplau, 1983; see Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998). Lewin's interest in the marital dyad was two-fold: he theorized this unit as a space where individuals had their basic needs met (or not) and as a space where individuals struggled with issues of conflict and conflict resolution. In terms of needs, Lewin focused on those needs that were particular to the intimate dyad – sexual needs – and negotiation about how sexual needs were to be met within the relational unit. Foreshadowing McClelland's later research on sexual expectations, in the following quote he touches on a number of related concepts when discussing sexual desire, including conflict, adaptation, balance, and satisfaction:

Sexual desire and disgust are closely related, and one may quickly turn into the other with the change of sexual hunger to satiation or oversatiation . . . All of these factors may lead to more or less difficult conflicts, and they imply the necessity of mutual adaptation. If within this realm no balance can be found which will give sufficient satisfaction to both partners, it will be difficult to keep the marriage intact (Lewin, 1940/1948, pp. 92–93).

Lewin's work on the marital unit is an early example of using a dyad as a space to theorize intergroup relations within a smaller unit of analysis. This interest in connecting experiences in the intimate space with those in the socio-political arena compellingly connects with Deutsch's work on the marital dyad (e.g., Kressel, Lopez-Morillas, Weinglass, & Deutsch, 1979), Opatow's work on the scope of justice as it plays out in interpersonal conflicts (1995) and on the bodies of those excluded (2011), and McClelland's (2010, in press) work on sexual satisfaction in diverse types of intimate couples. This shared line of research demonstrates an

interest in exploring justice questions within smaller units of social relations as a means to examine conflict, justice, and satisfaction – with an eye towards observing how these concerns about injustice travel bi-directionally between smaller social units and larger social institutions. In Lewin’s work on groups of all sizes we see the genesis for these questions as well as the language to imagine how the social can be very large and very small – even intimate – but essential to study no matter the size.

Key Justice Concepts

Before continuing, we briefly define the two constructs that relate to the work of each researcher: distribution of resources and levels of analysis. While these terms are not usually associated with Lewin (as compared to terms such as *field theory* and *life space*), we briefly explore their Lewinian roots and how they have been more explicitly addressed in subsequent research.

Distribution of Resources

Distributive justice is concerned with social justice in the distribution of the physiological, economic, and social conditions, as well as goods that affect individual well-being (Deutsch, 1985). It focuses on the attainment of parity in the distribution of societal goods and harms. Uriel Foa and Edna Foa’s (1974) seminal work on resource distribution makes a valuable and foundational contribution to distributive justice research. Their model, which offers a useful heuristic for understanding the many kinds of goods that people need, distribute, and withhold, identifies six fundamental resources: love, service, goods, money, information, and status. Foa and Foa argue that the giving and taking of resources within each of these six categories occurs within all types of settings and relationships – ranging from the interpersonal, to the intergroup, institutional, and societal.

In Foa and Foa’s model, each of the six resources (love, service, goods, money, information, and status) has its own characteristics, rules, and relationship to power. For example, “exchanges of love, unlike economic transactions, someone’s profit does not have to be another’s loss” (p. 200). In their model, each resource is governed by a set of rules or laws that define their “proper” exchange, specifically laws governing expected kinds of social exchange that occur within particular social roles (also see Walzer, 1983). By more closely examining how researchers have taken up resources identified by Foa and Foa, we can see how various resource types and the rules that govern their exchange offer insight into theories of distributive justice.

Levels of Analysis

Lewin’s work on the psychology of social dynamics ushered in a new framework for how researchers could conceptualize the person, the group, and interactions within social contexts. A model of psychology that included more than just the individual

significantly changed the way that researchers asked questions and the types of data they collected. It offered theories that became useful and relevant to describe the social person and the psychological dynamics observed in groups and social institutions. Inherent in Lewin's work is the idea that researchers must attend to *levels of analysis*. This concept of levels is a way to describe a set of more or less related concepts that are abstracted in order to observe, describe, and explain social phenomena (Sarup, 1975).

Some psychologists have remained tied to the idea that a phenomenon exists at a singular level of analysis, largely the individual (e.g., Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948). From this perspective, those who have argued that a phenomenon can be explained using multiple levels of analysis have been challenged to articulate exactly how his or her data help one to view, describe, and explain their findings. The argument for multiple levels of analysis has been built on the premise that individuals, groups, and social structures are not closed systems and that explaining one of them solely at its own level of analysis is not adequate (Sarup, 1975).

Pettigrew's (1997) theoretical work on levels of analysis offers a useful model because it considers the development of social psychological theories that attend to various kinds of justice concerns. Research has shown how important cross-level theoretical links can be (see Pettigrew, 2006, 2008). In Pettigrew's 1997 model, the *macro* level describes social structure including institutions, organizations, and cultures. The *micro* level is associated with the individual, including personality and biology. The *meso* level, which lies between the macro and the micro, is the situational level where social interactions occur, as Deaux (2006) describes: "[where] people engage with one another and, in so doing, transmit their own positions and are impacted by the attitudes and behaviors of others" (p. 4). Pettigrew's (1997) multi-level model encourages us to study and understand the psychological processes by which social norms become integrated and normalized within individuals and within a larger community. Said differently, the meso level is where the macro and micro interact.

In the academic lineage of Lewin-Deutsch-Opatow-McClelland that we explore here, we stretch this model incrementally and suggest that the macro and micro levels are constantly entwined; each inevitably entails the other. This means that in even the smallest unit of analysis, the macro comes alive. Because we see the micro and macro in an interlocking relationship with one another, we also identify and explore the methodological paradoxes that accompany this relationship: How can researchers observe, collect and analyze data that capture the micro and macro elements, as well as their entwined relationship?

With this in mind, we turn to the development of the constructs *distributive justice* and *levels of analysis* within the work of three generations of Lewinian scholars. The chapter moves from the past to the present so that we can see the accumulation of questions and approaches over three subsequent generations of scholars. We see how time and changing socio-political conditions serve to extend ideas and theories in innovative directions.

Morton Deutsch: Social Roles, Regulation, and Inequality

In his 1975 paper, “Equity, equality and need: What determines which value will be used as the basis of distributive justice,” Morton Deutsch defines the concept *distributive justice* as, “the distribution of the conditions and goods which affect individual well-being” (p. 137). He goes on to explain that well-being is not merely psychological, but also includes physiological, economic, and social aspects of well-being. In his 2006 chapter in *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, Deutsch discusses justice broadly, describing six forms of injustice and the relationship between justice and conflict. Deutsch draws on decades of social science and social issues thinking and research to make integrative and broad points about the nature of justice, inequity, and research.

Deutsch’s six types of injustice describe fair outcomes and fair treatment, which are assumed to be linked. His formulation articulates a simple yet important feedback system: what comes *before* affects what comes *after*. This echoes Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations (1973), which asserts a circular relationship between attitudes, behavior, and type of relationship: “the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of relationship tend also to elicit that type of social relationship” (p. 365). Talking openly and honestly, for example, can lead to cooperative relations, which, in turn, can produce a cooperative orientation to a conflict and lead to the constructive management of a conflict.

In describing the relationship between distributive and procedural justice, Deutsch (1975) argues that a sense of injustice is more often aroused by complaints about procedures than about distributive outcomes because, he states, “distributive values are often taken for granted while the procedures are not” (p. 35). This suggests that procedures tend to be more salient than distributions and distributions can be accepted as normal, even when they are unfair. Deutsch (2006) also posits an interactive relationship between procedural and distributive values:

[F]air procedures yield good information for use in the decision making processes as well as voice in the processes for those affected by them, and considerate treatment as the procedures are being implemented (p. 48).

This clarifies an important temporal relationship between these two prominent justice models and implies that procedures precede, and ultimately are in the service of, resource distribution. Indeed, the fair distribution of resources is a central theme in justice research. Definitions of what is “fair” and the range of resources available for distribution remain an open and debated question (see Hegtvedt & Cook, 2000, for overview). For example, when is fair considered to be the absence of bad, the presence of good, or both? How do definitions of fairness change when considering various types of groups (neighborhoods, groups, families, partners)? And how and when do people in various contexts (e.g., segregated housing, genocide, intimate relations) understand the injustice that is inevitably unevenly distributed within a society?

Like Foa and Foa, Deutsch (1975) has expressed the view that different values, norms, and rules define the appropriate system of justice for relations that have an

“economic,” “solidarity,” or “caring” character. In 2006, he explained, “Every type of system – from a society to a family – distributes benefits, costs, and harms” (p. 59). His work on interracial housing, *Interracial Housing: A Psychological Evaluation of a Social Experiment* (Deutsch & Collins, 1951), is a classic example of psychological research that is attentive to societal systems that distribute resources and to the negative effects of inequitable distribution for individuals in the social/caring sphere. Deutsch and Collins’ study compared two types of public housing: one was integrated and placed African Americans and whites as next door neighbors; the other was segregated and tenants were assigned to live in separate buildings based on race, as was the norm at that time. The study revealed that social arrangements of housing affected social relations, community morale, and individuals’ racial attitudes. Those who lived in integrated housing reported more positive inter-racial attitudes and fewer negative stereotypes than individuals living in segregated housing.

The research design used in this study, which sought to address the normalized and prevalent injustice of segregation, focused on domestic, proximate, and private experiences. In essence, this study made evident that the membrane between the public and private sphere was illusory and that a bidirectional relationship existed between segregation policies and individual racial attitudes. By focusing on the domestic spaces and people’s homes, Deutsch and Collins (1951) highlighted how individuals and families embody social policies and how these policies play out in mundane, everyday inter-personal encounters. In fact, these authors described the types of interactions they observed as *intimate*: “. . . neighborly contacts are of the more intimate types of contact” (p. 7). This focus on intimate contact and domestic space designated these contexts as worthy areas for research and, importantly, as contexts in which to develop psychological theory and knowledge.

There are echoes of Lewin in the naturalistic setting of the research, the focus on subjectivity in the research design, and the interest in social justice in the research question. Deutsch and Collins’s study of interracial housing foreshadows two additional links to Opotow and McClelland’s subsequent work. First, it draws attention to inclusionary possibilities within exclusionary contexts. This is a theme in Opotow’s work, such as her research using historical data to examine the inclusion of black Americans in Southern society after the American Civil War (Opotow, 2008a, 2008b). In Opotow’s study, she found evidence of social, political, legal, and economic inclusion in historical analyses of the Reconstruction (1885–1877) after the American Civil War (1861–1865). For example, she found that black communities built their own enduring, inclusionary social institutions that included schools, churches, and benevolent societies, but inclusionary gains for black Americans in the larger society were difficult to achieve or sustain.

The second link to subsequent work is seen in Deutsch and Collins’ focus on the domestic sphere as context for research. By identifying research participants who reported on their everyday behaviors and attitudes (housewives, in the case of the interracial housing study), the authors imagined interpersonal social contacts as meso level interactions among individuals and groups. Within these interactions, it is possible to observe how individual attitudes and beliefs (micro level) are affected

by societal institutions and systems (macro level). This elaboration of the social meanings of intimate contact foreshadows McClelland's research that similarly considers the intimate space not only as representative of the individual or family, but as containing within much of the information about social structures that is needed to understand the distribution of resources and considerations of fairness in social relationships.

While we have highlighted a thin slice of Deutsch's theoretical and empirical research here, it is clear how his elaboration of justice concepts in psychological research set the groundwork for decades of investigations into social roles, inequality, and the effects of everyday injustices. We have highlighted aspects of his work that we find especially provocative and productive in how they pushed the discipline of psychology to address issues of injustice: his focus on distribution of multiple types of resources, his use of naturalistic research designs, his interest in the domestic space as a site for research, and his vigilant focus on the role that societal structures play in individual beliefs and attitudes. These interests animated Lewin's research as well and by looking backwards in time to see Deutsch's influences, we are also able to see the profound influence Deutsch's work has had in subsequent generations of justice researchers.

Multi-generational collaborations and recognition of influence is required for justice work. Like many other justice projects that are focused on building resources, new norms, and developing inclusionary practices (Opatow, 2008b), academic researchers depend on the resources developed within one generation that are used in the next. This renewal and extension of resources is not often enough recognized beyond the required citations in our academic writings (cf., Morawski, 2001). Throughout this chapter, we recognize the resources, information, and caring (a variant of love), that animates the intergenerational scholarly dynamic required for social justice research.

Susan Opatow: Theorizing Conditions of Injustice in Contemporary and Historical Contexts

Inspired by the scholarship of Deutsch and others, Susan Opatow has studied changes in the scope of justice. In particular, she asks, "What social psychological conditions and contexts constrict or widen the scope of justice?" In the Scope of Justice scale, Opatow defined the scope of justice empirically, identifying three central attitudes that delineate the construct, *moral inclusion*: (1) believing that considerations of fairness apply to others; (2) willingness to allocate a share of community resources to others; and (3) willingness to make sacrifices to foster others' well-being (Opatow, 1987, 1993). The Scope of Justice scale enables researchers to study the psychological processes involved when specific persons and groups are imagined as deserving of resources or, conversely, imagined others as undeserving. Because one's scope of justice connects with basic beliefs and attitudes that circulate within the norms and practices of a society and are not always conscious, it

can influence people in ways that they may not be able to articulate. Thus, without critical scrutiny, one's scope of justice may seem normal, inevitable, and the way things are or ought to be (Opatow, 1987, 1990, 2011).

Opatow (1990, 1997) has argued that unless others are within one's scope of justice, the norms of distributive justice and the tenets of procedural justice can seem immaterial. A person would not feel distressed, for example, by distributive or procedural inequity directed at those they deem as outside the scope of justice and therefore as morally irrelevant. Yet distributive and procedural injustices play an important role in moral exclusion. They can foment moral exclusion by instituting exclusionary procedures and outcomes and they can solidify an exclusionary *status quo* with institutionalized exclusionary decisions and outcomes that perpetuate injury, debilitation, or elimination of those outside the scope of justice.

Opatow's early research took the distribution of rights, justice, and their potential to foster well-being for individuals and groups in a novel direction. By demonstrating that rights are distributed to both human and non-human beings, Opatow's work (1987, 1993) made plain the fact that resources are distributed according to often implicit decisions concerning deserving and entitlement. Opatow's research on the scope of justice added an important layer to the concept of resources. She articulated how individuals decided whether an "other" (of varying types) was entitled to or deserved resources.

Foa and Foa's (1974) six basic resources (love, service, goods, money, information, and status) tend to be seen as goods, but their absence can also inflict harm. For example, informal norms and formal laws that institutionalize the unavailability of key societal resources (e.g., affordable food, health care, and schools; fair wages; safe housing and working conditions) are essential mechanisms by which injustice is distributed. The lack of goods can inflict harms resulting in durable between-group disparities in well-being that can appear as fair or natural. Opatow articulated that resources did not simply mean allocating material goods; it also included relinquishing one's own claim on a good to foster an others' well being. Making personal or collective sacrifices and understanding that considerations of fairness are themselves a type of distributive resource, was an essential piece of justice research that had not yet been sufficiently theorized or empirically investigated (e.g., Opatow, 1993; cf., Hafer & Olsen, 2003).

Opatow (2001a, 2011) has identified three dimensions describing various expressions of exclusion from the scope of justice: *extent*, narrowly-focused within a society to widespread; *severity*, mild to blatant manifestations; and *expression*, passive to active behavior. In this theoretical model, each of the three dimensions can vary from low to high, producing a continuous set of conditions that enable researchers to envision moral exclusion not only as a multi-dimensional construct, but also as having a range of possible outcomes depending on the psychological, environmental, historical, and political contexts that surround individuals and groups. Across this topography of moral exclusion, it is possible to see, as Opatow (1990, 1995, 2011) has described, that those excluded from the scope of justice can be seen as: "(1) psychologically distant from oneself; (2) unworthy of constructive obligations; (3) nonentities, expendable, and undeserving; and

(4) eligible for processes and outcomes that would be unacceptable for those inside the scope of justice” (Opatow, 2001b, p. 158).

Opatow’s recent research not only investigates the conditions in which moral exclusion grows, but also uses historical examples to explore which conditions have enabled an inclusionary ethos to develop, including the post-Civil War era in the U.S. (2008a, 2008b) and Germany after World War II (2011). This research focuses on psychological aspects of a nation’s effort to grapple with past injustices they inflicted. She examines museums dedicated to wars and remembrance, and how the scope of justice is delineated in the design of museum exhibitions about unjust periods in the past, as well as how museums convey this past to contemporary visitors. This allows the observation of often-invisible psychological aspects of moral exclusion in society. Through the agency of curators and educators, museums can describe past exclusion from the scope of justice in ways that make the justice attitudes in that period salient and, at the same time, direct critical attention to the prevailing scope of justice in contemporary life.

Focusing on German museums dedicated to National Socialism (“Nazi”) in World War II, Opatow is able to examine an often-unexplored component of justice – information distribution. Historical moral exclusion and injustice, epitomized in genocide, are captured in evidence that is preserved and publically circulated as a mechanism of commemoration and reparation for past societal injustice. Repudiating this past is a first step to fostering an inclusionary ethos. By examining social injustices from this historical perspective, Opatow is able to observe change over time – not in terms of years, but over decades and generations. This enables the observation of psychological changes that accompany shifting social, economic, and political conditions, consistent with Lewin’s belief that we need an understanding of the world in which individuals and groups live in order to understand individual and group behaviors. Rather than describing psychological attitudes and beliefs as static, Opatow’s research is akin to a conceptual discriminant analysis that takes a given attitude, social justice or injustice in her case, and looks back to see what preceded it. She investigates the antecedents of the scope of justice to investigate its dynamic nature, both towards increasing inclusion and exclusion.

In her work on the approaches German museums take to motivate a close examination of the Holocaust, Opatow (2011) describes how a group of student hairdressers who visited the House of Wannsee Conference, a commemorative site and education center near Berlin, related the processes of genocide to their own profession (Kleiber, n.d.). During this visit they could see how marking people’s clothing and bodies also marked them as outside the scope of justice and fostered their annihilation. They were able to observe how marking Jews’ clothing with Jewish stars, publically shaving off Jewish women’s hair as a sign of degradation, tattooing bodies of people in concentration camp to mark them as property, and re-using body parts of those who were murdered were elements of the exclusionary continuum. This visit to the House of Wannsee Conference enabled these students to understand that the extreme moral exclusion and violence of the Third Reich was inflicted in many ways by many participants on many bodies, supporting an understanding that the extreme moral exclusion of Holocaust was achieved in physical micro-interactions, often enacted within the intimate space of the body.

Opatow's work extends Deutsch's considerations of social conditions in contexts of contemporary and historical conflict (e.g., Rwanda, the USA Civil War, and World War II). She theorizes and researches socio-political conflicts at the macro level in order to examine the psychology of injustice and trace change in the scope of justice (inclusionary, exclusionary, or both) over time that profoundly influence social relations and its relation to justice and injustice. Looking at post-war contexts she has found that, in each, inclusion followed exclusion as the result of a massive and sustained effort. In other words, to grasp intergroup relations it is important to understand the scope of justice as it is and how it has changed over time. The scope of justice, she argues, can only be understood in light of what came before. It is equally important to recognize conflicts within a society about what the scope of justice ought to be. The willingness to consider fairness, allocate resources, and make sacrifices to support the well being of particular groups influences how these groups will interact and whether that interaction will occur with the desire for more egalitarian or oppressive relations (Opatow, 2008b).

The methodological practice of historical analysis has enabled Opatow to observe those patterns that exist across time, across political conditions, and across national priorities. Attention to the inclusionary trajectory after the American Civil War, for example, indicates that achieving inclusion is a multi-generational project in which gains achieved by one generation may remain quiescent for years, even generations, but later emerge as important tools of social change. This was the case for the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the USA Constitution (approved during Reconstruction, 1865–1877) that conferred important rights on black Americans that were all but nullified in the violence of the Jim Crow period (ca. 1880–1965) when torture and lynchings visited societal violence on the bodies of black Americans (cf., Garland, 2005). These earlier gains served as legal tools a century later when the Civil Rights Movement (1960s) pushed for laws that fostered such inclusionary change as voting rights (Opatow, 2008a). It is in these patterns across time that we can see what socio-political conditions were required to de-naturalize inequality, reduce injustice, to substantially change the conditions affecting groups that been marginalized, and ultimately, foster the wellbeing of individuals and families.

One of the most important themes in Deutsch's work is a consistent focus on asymmetry and conflict at each level of analysis (and how asymmetry at one level affects other levels). When imagined at the macro level, asymmetry and conflict are often imagined in terms of violent conflict, social policies, and institutions that regulate and systematize inequity, such as the violently enforced racial segregation of the Jim Crow period in the USA (Opatow, 2008b) or the Holocaust (Opatow, 2011). When moving from the macro to micro levels of analysis, researchers often transfer these same ideas to the individual and consider behaviors and attitudes, such as inter-personal violence, prejudice, and hate (cf., Opatow & McClelland, 2007). It is possible, however, to see dynamics of inequality in ordinary social relations. Sara I. McClelland's work, which closely examines injustice in individuals, is, like Lewin, Deutsch, and Opatow, aware that societal norms and practices play out in individuals' everyday intimate relationships and lives.

Sara I. McClelland: Distributive Justice in the Intimate Domain

Sara I. McClelland focuses on what Foa and Foa (1974) might have described as the distribution of love. In her research on the strategies individuals use to evaluate the quality of their intimate experiences, McClelland braids together Lewin's interest in the production of social norms, Lewin and Deutsch's interest in the intimate relationship as an important site of negotiation, Deutsch's observation that even within intimate social relations there are concerns about distribution of scarce resources (Deutsch, 2006, p. 45), and finally, Opatow's articulation of how deservingness – fairness, as well as violence – is psychologically produced and enacted by individuals within societies.

McClelland combines all of these potent influences in her research on sexual satisfaction to inquire about the development of deservingness in sexual and intimate relationships. In addition to theorizing individuals' sense of deservingness as developed by Opatow (1990), McClelland extends this work and asks how the scope of justice might be unfairly applied to the *self* within relational dynamics. In her work, she asks, "What do we call exclusionary practices when the self imposes them him or herself in the form of lowered expectations?" This question encourages researchers working within the distributive justice paradigm to consider the distribution of deservingness within intimate relationships in new ways.

Issues of social justice in the sexual domain have largely been studied in terms of unlawful sexual behaviors, negative outcomes, and violence in inter-personal relationships. McClelland has looked, instead, at the distribution of satisfaction, i.e., the distribution of positive outcomes as a way to observe distributive justice. Building from Michelle Fine's (1988) influential work on discourses of desire in school environments and her subsequent collaborations with Fine (Fine & McClelland, 2006, 2007; McClelland & Fine, 2008a, 2008b), McClelland has focused on two aspects of the intimate domain: the perceived *quality* of intimate encounters (how satisfied one feels) and the *expectations* that individuals have for satisfying sexual experiences. In this research, McClelland investigates the sexual body as route to describe experiences of injustice, i.e., how individuals regard their own and others' bodies as deserving of relationally and sexually positive and satisfying experiences. Instead of using sex as a route to delimitate harms (e.g., genital mutilation, rape, coercion), McClelland's research focuses on the distribution of positive outcomes as a means to highlight that unequal distribution of "goods" in the intimate domain (cf., Nussbaum, 1999).

With some important exceptions (Steil, 1997, 2001), research on satisfaction in relationships has focused on close relationships (e.g., married couples), and particularly on perceptions of equity in non-sexual aspects of a couple (e.g., housework, child care; cf., Deutsch, 1999). The sexual aspects of a relationship, however, have received little attention, either due to it being seen as off limits, idiosyncratic, or, perhaps, because there have not yet been sufficient ways to imagine the distribution of resources within this domain. If sex is a site for justice research, a number of questions need to be assessed: What resources are distributed? What procedures

determine their distribution? Who is responsible for distribution? When does this occur? What mechanisms are used to decide what counts as reward? And what are possible reparations for harm in the private sphere?

Early equity theorist Hatfield's research on love and sex, in collaboration with Berscheid, has been influential in the psychological justice literature on close relationships (Hatfield, Rapson, & Aumer-Ryan, 2008). While this body of research made important strides in investigating individuals' estimations of fairness and equity, McClelland's work has, instead, focused on how inequity is normalized within intimate relationships, how expectations for reward and cost are determined, and how deservingness informs these decisions. Building from Steil's (1997, 2001) research on marital relationships, sexual relationships have the potential to inform and shape theoretical descriptions of how fairness are not only evaluated, but politically and socially determined through gender and sexuality norms. For example, given the extensive research on the negative influence gender norms have on sexual well-being, e.g., via sexual compliance, (Impett & Peplau, 2003) and gender norm conformity (Kiefer & Sanchez, 2007), men and women face very different social norms when engaging in or imagining sexual experiences. In addition, given the legal and social policies which regulate same-sex sexual behavior, heterosexual and same-sex couples varying levels of sexual stigma related to their sexual experiences (Herek, 2007). The question remains: How do these and other prevalent norms affect what individuals feel they deserve from their sexual experiences and intimate relationships?

The Role of Expectations in Justice Research

Answering questions about deservingness, posed above, requires understanding the role of expectations. Expectations are an important and under-theorized antecedent of sexual satisfaction judgments. *Sexual expectations* are an individual's beliefs about his or her future sexual self, including behaviors, relationships, feelings – and importantly, the quality of these elements in sexual experiences (Savin-Willams & Diamond, 2004). In the study of sexual expectations, the idiographic perspective has often been categorized as primary and un-problematically studied in isolation from the social and political spheres in which these expectations were developed.

Interestingly, researchers who study sexual satisfaction have consistently found that expectations are integral to individuals' sexual satisfaction evaluations, but have not investigated or analyzed the production of sexual expectations. For example, Byers and Wang (2004) reflect on the role of perceived equity and expectations of balance within the sexual dyad: "It appears that the precise rules governing the exchanges (i.e., equity or equality) are relatively unimportant as long as partners perceive their exchanges to be balanced" (p. 207). This point – that the perception of balance is primary – highlights the role of expectation within the sexual domain. Indeed, Lawrence and Byers (1992) found that sexual rewards were compared to a "general notion of how rewarding a sexual relationship should be" when evaluating

their levels of rewards. Lastly, DeLamater has made this point explicit in his definition of the construct: “Sexual satisfaction refers to the degree to which a person’s sexual activity meets his or her *expectations*” (DeLamater, 1991, p. 62, emphasis added).

What remains under-studied is the extent to which factors such as sexism and heterosexism persistently affect individuals’ expectations for sexual satisfaction and whether these contexts are sufficiently captured in existing theories and measures. Given that data on sexual satisfaction are often collected using close-ended measures and only within specific intimate relationships, questions remain concerning the range of dimensions, the valence of these dimensions, and the potential relationships between these dimensions for individuals when they make these evaluative decisions. In an effort to better understand the psychological dimensions in individuals’ appraisals and how these might be affected by social and sexual norms, McClelland designed a series of studies that examine definitions that individuals bring to their intimate experiences and whether these definitions are accurately captured in existing measures and methods. She has done this in diverse samples of heterosexual, lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) young adults (2009, 2010, in press).

The socio-political conditions surrounding this research are important to note as each historical moment provides its own context for research that imagines the body as a productive site for social justice research. In the early twenty first century, there have been a number of watershed political losses and gains that have set the stage for research on sexuality that extends beyond sexual identity and sexual behavior. These include, gains in same-sex marriage equality (Herek, 2006), attention on the negative effects of the sexualization of girls and young women (American Psychological Association, 2010), research on consequences of minority stress and stigma for same-sex couples (Frost & Meyer, 2009; Meyer, 2003), increased awareness of the toxic effects of bullying related to gender and sexuality of children and young adults (McKinley, 2010), as well as the negative consequences of abstinence-only sexual education in schools (Fine & McClelland, 2006), just to name a few. These social and political conditions serve to remind us that sexual rights and injustices are not simply found in inequitable outcomes, but in the infrastructure that upholds these rights and the public policies that distribute goods and punishments throughout an individual’s life. It also reminds us that young people are especially vulnerable as they grow up and depend on the structures and policies that govern and regulate – in this case, regulating sexual health (see Fine & McClelland, 2007).

With these conditions in mind and building from existing research on the sexual development of young adults (see Tolman & McClelland, 2011), McClelland has made steps to fill in the missing elements of what we know about young people and how they develop into healthy sexual adults. Due to a nearly exclusive focus on a sexual health model that is concerned with avoiding disease, we know little about helping young people develop sexual expectations for pleasure and satisfaction or how to measure these outcomes in research settings. This is an important gap to address in the literature on young people, but is also an important consideration in research pertaining to individuals across the life span. McClelland’s work, to date, has focused on the role of gender roles and sexual stigma and how these

separately and together affect sexual expectations. Both are deeply rooted in what men and women are expected to do and with whom. Critical discussions of gender roles and sexual stigma have been and should continue to be concerned with linking public policies regarding sexuality with private experiences and documenting how the public insinuates itself in intimate moments (Fine & McClelland, 2007).

In a set of companion studies, McClelland (2009) examined rates and definitions of sexual satisfaction in two samples of young adults. In order to examine these issues of evaluation, fairness, and satisfaction, McClelland used a modified version of Cantril's (1965) self-anchored ladder item in order to examine how participants organized a scale that did not provide guidance on how to interpret the low, middle, and high ends of a sexual satisfaction 10 point Likert scale.

This study revealed that men and women imagined a very different low end of the sexual satisfaction scale. While women imagined the low end of a sexual satisfaction scale to include the potential for extremely negative feelings and the potential for pain, men imagined the low end of a sexual satisfaction scale to represent the potential for less satisfying sexual outcomes, but they never imagined harmful or damaging outcomes for themselves. This finding is not completely surprising given the fact that women's sexual vulnerability is well documented (Blackman, 1989). For the purposes of research, however, this finding alerts us to the fact that the low end of the scale may be very differently interpreted by men and women. When a woman is asked to rate her sexual satisfaction and she is presented with a scale that ranges from "low" to "high," a woman's comparison point when evaluating "low" may be qualitatively different than a man faced with the same item. For women, low sexual satisfaction signals the potential presence of pain associated with sex, while for men low sexual satisfaction signals the absence of good or plentiful sex.

An examination of the mid- and high-points of the scale also revealed a gendered pattern. Women largely described the mid-point of the scale in terms of being physically but not emotionally satisfying, with the highest possible sexual satisfaction was in the union of these two experiences. Descriptions of the mid-point that were typical for women included, "no connection with the person," "nothing special," and "no orgasm." The move towards the high-end was additive, meaning that the high end included both people having orgasms and feeling "connected" to one another. For men, the mid-point often included "normal" sex, "just plain ol' orgasm," or masturbation. On the high end, men often described their partners' satisfaction, with phrases such as, "she was pleased," "a close relationship with the person," and "both participants enjoyed, neither was left unhappy," but it was mostly in the high end of the scale where the men included their partners.

Across these studies, McClelland has consistently found that heterosexual women defined their satisfaction using social and relational cues. The inclusion of partners (and their satisfaction) was often used as a baseline, while heterosexual men more consistently defined satisfaction as an individual embodied act and social qualities were less frequently used to determine their satisfaction. This raises important questions about how to interpret the "naturalness" of these priorities and, on the one hand, could be read as reinforcing a stereotype of women as naturally socially oriented and therefore, attentive to the needs of others (Buss, 1998).

Alternatively, these findings could be interpreted as evidence of how historically marginalized groups rely on and imagine dystopian comparisons when making evaluative judgments about the quality of their lives.

This finding parallels Deutsch and Collins' (1951) findings in the interracial housing study in which black participants reported increased satisfaction with integrated housing and relationships with white neighbors. Taking a page from the critical interpretation that Deutsch and Collins used in their study, it is imperative to consider the range of definitions of "fair" in research environments: When is "fair" defined the absence of negative, painful, or damaging alternatives? And, how as researchers can we observe how people make sense of injustice, while at the same time, not conflating this sense-making process with natural or individually decided priorities?

By examining how young adults narrated and defined satisfaction in their intimate relationships, McClelland has been able to observe patterns in how individuals anchor their level of satisfaction in relationship to the amount of resources that they had imagined as possible. By theoretically framing satisfaction as not only as a person-level outcome, but as a socially produced process through social interaction (which is variable by gender and sexual orientation), McClelland is able to demonstrate how individual assessments of intimate experiences – that which some may see as beyond the reach of the social – are indeed social in nature and have justice import. The methods and findings in McClelland's work have important resonance with Opatow's (2011) observations of contemporary German hairdressers witnessing the history of hair in marking Jews during the Holocaust: the physical body is consistently a site of moral exclusion – by oneself or by another. As psychologists, we have each struggled with the paradox of making evident this fusion of the micro and macro, private and public, intimate and social.

In a recent article, McClelland (2010) elaborates an *intimate justice* framework that outlines how sexuality researchers can consider and systematically measure the ways that social and political antecedents shape sexual satisfaction ratings in men and women. Feeling satisfied in any domain, such as work, marriage, or friendship, concerns issues of distributive and as procedural justice in the ability to challenge, appeal, exit, and rethink the *status quo*. It also has implications for inclusionary justice (Opatow, 1990). We see this as an important extension of Lewin and Deutsch's work on the intersection of person and environment, a new application of theories on moral exclusion and deservingness, and a contribution to how social injustice at the micro and macro levels are entwined.

Working in the spirit of feminist concerns that do not merely highlight the extreme dangers experienced by individuals, but the mundane experiences of injustice (Nussbaum, 1999), McClelland's work, building on Lewin, Deutsch, Opatow, Fine and others, encourages researchers to consider how micro relationships serve as an important site not only to observe conflict, but also to normalize inequity. Adding the intimate level to justice concerns highlights the specificities of contexts and norms which can inform justice theories that are traditionally applied to larger social units and more distal types of social relationships. When considering the physical body and concerns of justice, when the body is considered, it is more

consistently excused as idiosyncratic, personal, chosen – so what might have been called unjust is recoded as “personal choice.” This sets up a larger question of thinking through the role of justice research in the micro domain: what are the challenges when investigating issues related to intimate justice?

Conclusion: Implications for Distributive Justice Theory

This chapter grounds the social justice research of four genealogically consecutive scholars within the particular socio-political conditions of their lives. Their work is attentive to contemporary socio-political conditions and those in their past, both at the macro (society) and micro (personal) level. It is important to note that during each of their lives, the history of their society shaped their world view and their scholarship. Three areas we see as especially provocative in justice research that become even more compelling when viewed through their development and over time: the role of resources in justice research, levels of analysis, methodological challenges facing researchers working in this field.

Resources are essential in justice research, their kind, their rules of distribution, and their exchange (cf., Foa & Foa's, 1974 Social Exchange Theory) in social relationships. Like resource specificity (i.e., type of resource), each level of analysis offers different perspectives on distributive justice, its workings, and the challenges of achieving greater equality and justice in society. Lewin (1935) famously proposed the interaction of the person and environment in producing social behavior. When we look at smaller social units of analysis, such as the family, the marital relationship, or intimate relations, we see that differentiating the person and the environment requires careful distinctions (i.e., what differentiates the person from the environment?) Procedural justice may not only be prior to distributive decisions, but constitute the environment for those decisions. Consistent with Foa and Foa (1974), particular resources call up particular exchange relationships, implying or even creating a social environment, suggesting a key relationship between resources and environments.

In the research of three generations of Lewinian scholars, we see an important conceptual link in their interest in and methodological attention to the scope of justice. Each is attentive to the dynamics by which the scope of justice undergoes change, particularly as it shrinks to reduce the applicability of justice, inevitably changing how people make sense of justice and injustice. Justice scholars have primarily studied entitlement as an outcome (i.e., “did the individuals feel equally treated?”). In contrast, an important thread that links this work is an analysis of *entitlement* as a process that is continually informed by social norms, public policies, and a psychology of insider and outsider status that is enacted in micro relationships. Stated broadly, this work asks: “When, how, where, and by whom are decisions made that reshape the scope of justice and change what parties (believe they) deserve?” This approach to justice research, as Lewin has argued, reveals the influence of the person and the environment.

Research at intimate levels has something important to teach scholars interested in social psychological processes. While “social” tends to be interpreted in macro-level forms (i.e., inter-group processes), in sex research, “social” tapers to the biographic, challenging notions about what factors contribute to an intimate *status quo*. It becomes difficult to delineate the boundary where the “social” stops and the “person” starts. Similarly, Orbuch and Harvey (1991) argue that sexual relationships are just another social psychological process by which to study how “individuals are influenced by the real, imagined, or implied presence of others” (p. 9, citing Allport, 1968). Social psychologists can learn something in this extremely narrowed *social* environment. However, it requires sharper definitions in order to live up to Lewin’s (1935) interactionist model of the person and the environment and to account for a continuum in which these two categories so readily blur into one another (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). This observed fusion between the intimate and the social is not new and is, in fact, one of the primary premises of feminist research (Holland et al., 1998). We comment on it here because it is an example of how feminist and social psychological theories mutually inform research design, methods, and findings and how both, at their core, attend to justice issues in the relationship of the personal to the political.

Methodological Paradoxes of Studying Reduced Expectations

Across these bodies of work, there is a shared interest in an often unstated paradox within justice research – an acknowledgement that social conditions affect individuals and their sense of deserving. If so, what are the limits of methods relying on individuals (sometimes those who are most affected by injustice) to articulate their own wants and deserving? Can research design give researchers “night vision goggles” enabling them to see what is ordinarily invisible and normalized? What limitations result from methods that require those most affected by injustice to provide data on injustice? And what types of methods need to be developed in an effort to collect data on individual experiences and experiences of injustice that do not require the individual to see beyond normalized injustice in order to demand reparation? Psychological research in this same spirit includes Crosby’s work on the denial personal discrimination (1982, 1984), Major’s work on social comparison (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984), and Biernat and colleagues’ work on shifting standards (1991). These are examples of researchers working to both attend to evaluations of individuals *and* the social conditions in which these evaluations are made.

Looking to other fields, we see other theorists who have articulated this same phenomenon. For example, Nussbaum (1999) uses the term “preference deformation” (p. 151) to discuss the process of adaptation in which an individual’s preferences are shaped to accord with the frequently narrow set of opportunities that one has. Nussbaum argues that the liberal tradition regards people’s satisfaction and preferences simply as given. She argued, “Empirically, it has been amply demonstrated

that people's desire and preferences respond to their beliefs about social norms and about their own opportunities. Thus, people usually adjust their desires to reflect the level of their available possibilities" (1999, p. 11). Economist Sen (1995) has argued that we see this is the phenomenon internationally in basic health, nutrition and security issues: "If one does not know what it is like to feel well nourished, it is especially easy to be content with the undernourished state in which one lives . . . The existence of such 'adaptive preferences,' Sen argues, gives us strong reasons to be highly mistrustful of existing preferences in choosing social policies" (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 151).

Throughout this chapter, we have considered the methodological challenges justice researchers face when seeking to collect data from individuals who experience injustice. What does it mean to do research on justice when methods need to be constantly critically examined for their prejudices, particularly when the scope of justice remains implicit? It is not enough to ask whether outcomes are perceived to be distributed equally. McClelland (2010) argues that researchers must also inquire as to the nature of the benchmarks being used, the history of the groups and individuals being assessed, and evaluate how each is deciding what is "good enough." Findings of high satisfaction in impoverished or discriminatory settings (e.g., Crosby, 1984) encourage us to reflect back on the theories we are using to organize human emotions and behaviors (Deutsch & Krauss, 1965).

This recognition of the permeable membrane between the political and the personal, the public and the private, and the large and the small, links these four generations of social psychologists together. Each of us has addressed this permeability by making critical methodological decisions that enable us to try and capture not only the person but also his or her social context in ways that denaturalize and destabilize the conceptual and methodological firewall that is often maintained between the two. Beginning with Lewin's (1939) influential conceptualization of "field theory" and his experiment studies of authoritarianism (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939), to Deutsch's theoretical contributions and studies in the lab and in the field, to Opatow's study of museums and use of archival data to examine changes in the scope of justice over time, and finally, McClelland's revival of historical psychological methods including Cantril's ladder (1965) and Stephenson's (1953) Q methods, these four researchers have worked to continually make evident the range of methods that are available and necessary to do social psychological research that is concerned with issues of justice.

Genealogy of Mentorship: The History of Ideas

We have taken a modified personality psychology "lives" approach (Ryff, 1987) to trace Morton Deutsch's work on justice, both its origins and how it has moved forward in two generations of scholars. This approach is fundamentally collaborative in its recognition of scholarship as an intergenerational project that supports asking difficult questions with deep social import and using innovative approaches

to answer them. The theoretical, methodological, and contextual grounding of past work enables the continuing development of theory, method, and applications. We recognize the multi-generationality of our work as well as our debt to our mentors and theirs. Although we take almost eight decades as our unit of time, it is, of course, historically brief and incomplete. We do not, for example, describe Kurt Lewin's advisor, German philosopher and psychologist Carl Stumpf or his mentors. Nor can we capture the enormous network of influences that informs any program of research.

But our approach, which is genealogical and bounded, nevertheless suggests how multiple voices inform, complicate, and facilitate our thinking (cf., Bakhtin, 1981). Taking the idea of our indebtedness, as well as our interests in continually developing justice research to be applicable and relevant to researchers, policy makers, and students, we have explored the tradition of the academic citation and extended it well beyond traditional parameters of author name and year. We have stretched the notion of indebtedness to include not only previous research and relevant findings, but also stretched the notion of citation to include the tremendous intergenerational influences that could not possibly be contained between two small parentheses.

Morton Deutsch's Comments

Chapter by Sara I. McClelland and Susan Opatow

Although I have not yet met Sara I. McClelland, I am delighted that she considers me to be one of her intellectual ancestors. Her research studies as well as those of her mentor, Susan Opatow, are highly original, socially important, and very much in the intellectual tradition of social psychology initiated by Kurt Lewin.

My work in social psychology has been much influenced by Lewin as was the work of the other students and faculty at the Research Center for Group Dynamics (RCGD) at M.I.T. In the spring of 1978, at the invitation of Stanley Schachter and myself, the surviving members of the RCGD met at Columbia University. The participants included Kurt Bach, Dorwin Castwright, Leon Fetinger, Jack French, Alberto Pepetone, Stanley Schachter, and myself. At this reunion (the first and last one), the participants were asked to indicate how Lewin has influenced their work. From the discussion, it was evident that all of us had been very much influenced by Lewin's way of thinking about science and by his general orientation to psychology. This is what had most impact on the participants. Very few were still involved with Lewin's conceptual language or terminology, with topological and vectorial psychology. Some had been stimulated to do work that related to Lewin's specific theoretical ideas, particularly those relevant to tension systems, level of aspiration theory, social interdependence, group leadership, group decision making, changing individual attitudes, and quasi-stationary equilibria. And several were stimulated

by Lewin to be concerned with articulating the connections between social psychological theory and change in social practice.

Nevertheless, the common thread that linked our group of past RCGD members together was a Lewinian way of thinking. It emphasized the importance of theory; the value of experimentation for clarifying and testing ideas; the interrelatedness between the person and the environment; the interdependence of cognitive structures and motivation; the importance of understanding the individual in his/her social (group, cultural) context; the usefulness of theory for social practice; and the value of trying to change reality for the development of theory. These emphases are not unique to the Lewinian way of thinking; they characterize good social science and good social practice. But Lewin was the one who introduced them to social psychology. In my mentoring of graduate students and my writings about Lewin and field theory, I have sought to pass on to future generations Lewin's basic approach to science, his metatheory (Deutsch, 1954, 1992).

Although I was profoundly influenced by Lewin's approach, he was not the only influence on my work in social psychology. The writing of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Margaret Mead also influenced my work. Marx's writing stimulated some of my thinking about distributive justice; Freud helped me to understand what keeps an oppressive relationship in place; and Mead helped me to recognize the broader cultural influences on systems of justice. I note that the ideas of Marx, Freud, and Mead were not alien to Lewin. Just prior to his premature death in 1947, Lewin became interested in Marx's writing and was beginning to think how he could incorporate some of Marx's ideas into his work. David Rapaport, a very important psychoanalytic theorist, tried to incorporate Lewin's tension system theory to clarify some psychoanalytic processes. I met Margaret Mead, for the first time, at a social event sponsored by Marrow, one of Lewin's most devoted supporters.

I now turn to the work of the authors of the chapter. I know Susan Opatow's work very well but I only know of Sara I. McClelland's work through their chapter. The research by Susan Opatow on what leads to moral exclusion, as well as the conditions which foster moral inclusion is of profound importance. It helps us to understand why many oppressors feel no guilt; why Nazi leaders who executed Jews were sometimes good family men; why the captains of the ships who brought slaves to the United States, under the most abominable conditions, were often leaders of their church in New England. Opatow's work has opened up an area of research of great theoretical and social importance. Many other researchers should enter their area. It is relevant to such important issues as: the Holocaust, terrorism, animal rights, and reconciliation as well as many others.

Sara I. McClelland's work is new to me. Her approach to understanding intimate sexual relations is excellent. She has a clear grasp of the fact that

moral issues, issues of social justice, enter into all social relations, micro and macro. Throughout much of the world, and much of history, women's subordination to men has been expressed, at the microlevel, in sexual relations (women are sexual objects for male satisfaction; their sexual desires are denied, ignored, or considered immoral) and, at the macro level, denial of their human and political rights (such as their rights to education, economic independence, political participation, the right to divorce, etc.).

Let me note my appreciation of their citation of the work of Foa and Foa, whose important ideas have been largely neglected.

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