

## The Intensification of Hating: A Theory

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*Hate, a simple word, is easily understood by young children. But as a concept, hate is vast, complex, and slippery. The study of hate is not limited to one discipline; it is studied throughout the humanities and social sciences. This paper, which presents a psychological theory of hating, argues that hate is an understudied psychological construct and has particular relevance to justice research. Hate can trigger injustice, and injustice has the capacity to trigger derogation, violence, and hate. Relying on four literatures—justice, psychology, psychoanalysis, and criminal justice—we present a theory of hating that describes the formation, perpetuation, and expression of this influential emotional state. The Intensification Theory of Hating describes hate as a dynamic process that moves from antecedents to emotions, cognitions, morals, and behaviors. Hate, we argue, is not only an emotion; it becomes systemic when interactions among its components unfold over time to intensify hate. We conclude by proposing research approaches and questions that could address hate in psychological and justice research.*

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**KEY WORDS:** hate; justice; violence; morals; affect; criminal justice; psychoanalytic theory.

### INTRODUCTION

On August 7, 2005, Glenn Moore, a black man walking home at night in Brooklyn, was attacked and robbed by six young white men (McFadden, 2005; Milton, 2006). The assailants, traveling in a van, made an abrupt

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U-turn, got out of the van, and shouted racial slurs as they kicked and hit Moore's head and body with baseball bats and iron pipes. They robbed him and fled when a passing couple intervened. The same day in Manhattan, a man suffered head and face injuries when two men made homophobic statements, beat him, and fled (Man injured in anti-gay attack, Police say, 2005). In both crimes, the assailants were men who acted as a group, attacked a stranger whom they took by surprise and then fled.

These characteristics typify hate crime. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (Department of Justice, 2004) reports that racial and sexual-orientation bias account for more than two thirds of hate crimes (53.8% and 15.6%, respectively; religion bias also accounts for 16.4%) and assailants are more likely to be white (60.6%) than black (19.7%). In these attacks, like many others, assailants acting as a group are physically and symbolically aggressive to communicate their hatred of individuals, groups, and communities (cf., Craig, 2002).

We begin this paper on hate with this standard script, so familiar and often faithfully followed by assailants, to argue that while the *modus operandi* of hate crime has been well studied, we know little about the social psychology of hating from the perspective of its perpetrators. We do not know whether they see hate crime as thrill seeking, retaliatory, defensive/protective, or as a righteous mission (McDevitt *et al.*, 2002). And we know little about how they came to feel the hate they enact or how this impulse to hate became violence. In order to delineate this progression, we present a psychological theory of hating.

Hate, we argue, is not only an emotion. It is also a justice construct. Hate can trigger injustice, and injustice has the capacity to trigger derogation and violence. We present a theory of hating by first defining hate and discussing its treatment in justice, psychological, psychoanalytic, and criminal justice research. Second, we present two contemporary examples of hate—white supremacy in the U.S. and sectarian hatred in Iraq. Third, we present an Intensification Theory of Hating consisting of: antecedents, affect, cognitions, morals, and behaviors. The theory is attentive to micro and macro levels of analysis, unconscious and irrational elements, and intensification of hate over time. Finally, the paper suggests research approaches, proposes a set of research questions, and argues for multi-disciplinarity in conceptualizing and studying this important and complex construct.

## DEFINING HATE

The journalist Andrew Sullivan, writing after the murders of James Byrd Jr. in Texas and Matthew Sheppard in Wyoming (the former killed by

being dragged behind a truck in 1998 and the latter left to die after being beaten and tied to a fence in 1996), mused on the varieties of hate:

There is hate that fears, and hate that merely feels contempt; there is hate that expresses power, and hate that comes from powerlessness; there is revenge, and there is hate that comes from envy. There is hate that was love, and hate that is a curious expression of love. There is hate of the other, and hate of something that reminds us too much of ourselves. There is the oppressor's hate, and the victim's hate. There is hate that burns slowly, and hate that fades. And there is hate that explodes, and hate that never catches fire. (Sullivan, 1999, p. 54)

Sullivan's images simultaneously highlight hate's simplicity and its many manifestations. The common meaning of hate seems obvious, even to young children. But partly because of its many manifestations, defining it can be tricky. In *The Truce*, Primo Levi (1967) captures hate's intensity and power and how it gains momentum in a spiral with profound human significance:

It is an inexhaustible fount of evil; it breaks the body and the spirit of the submerged, it stifles them and renders them abject; it returns as ignominy upon the oppressors, it perpetuates itself as hatred among the survivors, and swarms around in a thousand ways, against the very will of all, as a thirst for revenge, as a moral capitulation, as denial, as weariness, as renunciation. (p. 426)

Levi goes on to describe how hate is transferred, self-perpetuating, and contagious. Affectively, this description is astonishingly rich. The image of hate swarming "in a thousand ways" captures its complexity and forecasts the importance of defining hate as a dynamic process and not as a singular experience with a beginning and an endpoint.

In the *Encyclopedia of Human Behavior*, Gerald Schoenewolf (1994) defines hate more dispassionately and clinically:

A state of arousal or excitation in humans in which anger, negative judgments, and impulses of destruction predominate. This state is produced by a combination of biological and environmental factors. Manifestations of hate are numerous, ranging from subtle, individual reactions expression to outright violence and war. However, not all hate is bad. Some hate is constructive while other hate can be constructive and beneficial. (p. 501)

Using the language of psychology, Schoenewolf draws our attention to emotional aspects of hate and identifies its relevance at various levels of analysis. Although hate can play a positive role in motivating responses to injustice (consistent with Primo Levi and with popular usage), we focus on hate as a negative construct that can trigger destructive conflict and violence.

In sum, these three definitions indicate that *hate* can be understood in several ways:

1. as an emotion, viscerally felt;
2. as readiness to act hatefully;
3. as actions that intend to harm;
4. as a worldview, an ideology.

Building on these definitions, we conceptualize hate in two ways. First, as in emotion that can occur by itself, or, more often, with such related emotions as: anger, indignation, rage, and aggression; second, as a systematic construct that develops and persists within a dynamic process. The theory places the first meaning, viscerally-felt emotion, as one component in this systemic larger process.

## HATE IN FOUR LITERATURES

Perhaps because of hate's complexity and the wide range of its manifestations, psychological research has narrowed its focus when studying hate. There is research on the harm of hate crimes and homophobia (cf., Boeckmann and Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Cogan and Marcus-Newhall, 2002; Herek and Berrill, 1992); hate felt by particular categories of people (e.g., children; cf., Varma, 1993); hate at particular levels of analysis, such as interpersonal hate (Goldberg, 1993) or mass hate (Kressel, 1996); and psychoanalytic sources of hate and their implications for clinical practice (Akhtar *et al.*, 1995). These studies are informative, but do not theorize hate as a whole. Often, too, these approaches focus on the effects of hate rather than the source of hating and hate's trajectory. Without understanding hate from the perspective of one who hates, theories of hating remain incomplete. To take this larger view, we turn to four literatures—justice, psychology, psychoanalysis, and criminal justice—to learn how researchers have defined and worked with hate.

### Justice Research

Justice research has examined consequences of just and unjust treatment, most often from perspective of the harmed party (e.g., van den Bos, 2003; also see Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger and Cropanzano, 1998; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Harm-doers, when considered, are assumed to be in a state of psychological discomfort after enacting experimentally induced harmful or unfair behavior. In this research paradigm, harm-doers are frequently given an opportunity to repudiate their behavior and restore justice, psychological equilibrium, and damaged relationships (e.g., Lamm and Schwinger, 1980; Schmitt *et al.*, 2004). This research approach provides data on the psychological processes involved in the pursuit of justice; it tells us less, however, about the psychological state of an individual who does not experience discomfort, but instead retains his or her negative appraisal of the target. This question concerns the intersection of justice and emotion.

Over the past three decades, some justice research has explicitly explored the connection between injustice and emotion (e.g., Clayton, 1992;

Mikula *et al.*, 1998; Lamm and Schwinger, 1980; Scherer, 1988, 1992). Yet in spite of the obvious connection between injustice and emotion found in numerous studies (Miller, 2001), affect remains understudied, as editors of this *Social Justice Research* issue argue (De Cremer and van den Bos, 2007). In their review of the literature on affect and justice, Mikula *et al.* (1998) state:

Although the issue of emotional responses to injustice is present on a theoretical level, albeit often only implicitly, empirical studies of this phenomenon are few and far between, in spite of repeated pleas for systematic investigations of the nature of the emotional responses elicited by injustice. (p. 769)

Some empirical work examines the effect of procedural justice on positive emotions—feeling proud, joyful, happy, cheerful, and relieved (De Cremer and Alberts, 2004). The causal arrow can be reversed and procedural justice judgments can also be influenced by prior affective states (van den Bos, 2003). Other research, relevant to hate, considers the relationship between injustice (often inequity) and negative emotions: distress (Hassebrauck, 1991), aggression (Beugré, 2005), disappointment, anger (Clayton, 1992), disgust, fear, and sadness (Mikula *et al.*, 1998), rage, indignation (Mikula, 1986), guilt (Sprecher, 1992) and derogation (Kay *et al.*, 2005). While these negative emotions are close to hate, they are not the same as hate.

The emotion hate may be implicated throughout the process of harming others. However, justice research does not often address the original emotion that may have given rise to the harm-doing or resulted from harm-doing—namely, hate. Instead, the next step—the moment of transformation or reconciliation—becomes the focus of research. Justice, imagined as transforming a damaged relationship (through apology, contrition, etc.), depends on the harm-doer's desire to reduce distress and shift back to a state of equilibrium. This state of equilibrium is assumed to be necessary, desirable, and possible. Justice, for example, has been described as having the potential to, “motivate engagement and cooperation” (Tyler and Blader, 2003, p. 351). Positive states, however, are implicitly seen as the norm, while negative emotional states are implicitly seen as transient. What if reconciliation and a shift back to equilibrium does not happen and, instead, a negative emotional state is sustained? Would hate emerge and linger? Would a non-penitent perpetrator who continues to hate violate prevailing societal norms of relationships?

Justice norms have been theorized and investigated for three distinct but interrelated kinds of fairness that concern the contingencies *what*, *how*, and *who* (Opatow, 1997; Clayton and Opatow, 2003). *Distributive justice* concerns outcomes and address *what* norms are utilized for the fair distribution of resources, for example, equity, equality, and need (Deutsch, 1985). *Procedural justice* concerns process and addresses *how* voice, consistency, impartiality, accuracy, interpretations, correctability, and respect foster

fairness (Leventhal, 1980; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). *Inclusionary justice* concerns participation and addresses *who* is within the scope of justice and therefore protected by society's norms, rules, and values (Opotow, 1990, 1995). Moral exclusion research theorizes that harming others is facilitated by seeing them as hated enemies or invisible non-entities outside the moral community and its protective norms.

Opotow's (2005) research on the relationship between moral exclusion and hate proposes that they are a potent combination. Hate charges narrative details about disliked social categories with emotion. Moral exclusion, attuned to who counts and who does not, justifies harmful acts directed at hated targets. Without the justificatory framework of moral exclusion, hate might remain inchoate, unexpressed, and more readily wane. However, the emotional-cognitive logic of hate, combined with the justificatory framework of moral exclusion, can be powerful and contagious. It can jump levels of analysis from individually experienced hate to collectively experienced hate and be brutal in unprecedented ways.

The intersection of hate and moral exclusion prompts several questions about hate. First, not all people outside the moral community are harmed, suggesting decisions are made on the way to harm-doing. Second, moral communities are assumed as benign, but some moral communities, such as neo-Nazis, support hate. Third, moral exclusion theory focuses on the present and immediate past, but it does not go back in time to early origins of an impulse to harm within an individual (however, see Deutsch, 1990).

### Psychology

Psychology, long interested in human well being, does not have a cohesive or sustained focus on hate. With few exceptions, psychological dictionaries, encyclopedias, and texts lack an entry for hate. Interest, however, may be increasing. Recent work in psychology provides useful approaches to theorizing hate from the perspective of the hater. An edited book, *The Psychology of Hate* (Sternberg, 2005), covers cognitive, social, developmental, and clinical conceptualizations of hate. A special issue of *Personality and Social Psychology Review* (1999) on the evolution of evil and violence explores the perspective of an aggressor (e.g., Bandura, 1999; Staub, 1999).

Taking the perpetrator's perspective, Baumeister and Campbell (1999) discuss the harm-doing of sadism. In contrast to discomfort experienced by the perpetrator in the justice research, their perpetrator finds harm-doing pleasurable, seeking thrilling sensations to escape boredom or to blunt threats to self-image. Baumeister and Campbell describe sadistic harm-doing as accidental and not inflicted with hate: "the causing of harm may be incidental to the perpetrators, such as being a side effect of the quest for

sensations, and often, it may be unintended or at least not premeditated” (p. 219). This account allows for a perpetrator that harms, but does not account for intentionality in that harm: “the perpetrator may regard the victim’s suffering as trivial and as irrelevant to the perpetrator’s goals and satisfactions” (p. 210). This is not the same as hate.

Research on the perspective of the evil perpetrator focuses on individuals, but does not probe into their past. John Darley (1999) describes the need to look at social-cultural contexts, the past, and on-going socialization:

To provide an explanation of a person who, independently, using his will and intelligence, acts to torture others...we need to include in our explanation the recognition that the actor has been socialized, that is, permanently changed by the processes that brought him to this state. (p. 269)

For obvious reasons, he explains, these cognitive structures are not ones that we generally find in our psychological experiments; torture is not a behavior that can be ethically invoked in research.

Developmental psychologists who work on the juncture between the past and the present offer a way to imagine how the phenomena we observe in our own research have past as well as current psychological elements. At the individual level of analysis, this research clarifies that inter-subjectivity and emotion develop over time in developmental trajectories (Bruner, 2000). At the group level of analysis, Ervin Staub (1999) outlines a number of antecedents to collective violence in Rwanda including having basic needs consistently unmet and unhealed wounds in society. Two areas in psychological research—emotion and cognition—have taken on the question of what hate and hateful behaviors look like.

### *Emotion*

Hate is assumed to be a strong emotion. Several theories offer insight into intrapsychic aspects of emotion. Nico Frijda (1986) describes emotion as a middle term mediating an event and an outcome. Something triggers an emotion, which then shapes perceptions, actions, and social relationships. In his theory, emotion is “a hypothesis to explain behavior that has neither sufficient nor adequate external purpose or reason; the explanation is then sought ‘within’ the subject” (Frijda, 1986, p. 2). This theory highlights physiological change, non-instrumental behavior, and subjective evaluation of perceived events and their significance.

Recent research adds to the study of emotion the role of the self when “taking it personally” (Shields, 2002, p. 6) and cognition when emotion is an “act of categorization guided by embodied knowledge” (Barrett, 2006, p. 20). Together, these theories argue that we evaluate physically experienced, autonomic information in light of the context, how we label elements in that context, and how we see ourselves in relation to others present in that context.

Robert Zajonc (1984) observes that “no emotional reactions occur in a vacuum” (p. 121). He emphasizes that emotions are always present, even if at an unconscious level: “the individual is never *without* being in some emotional state” (p. 121, emphasis in original). Zajonc proposes that the relationship between emotion and cognition is bi-directional and that they continually influence each other.

Smith and Ellsworth (1985), who examine positive emotions and negative emotions—such as shame, fear, frustration, anger, guilt, sadness, guilt, contempt, disgust, and boredom—find two patterns in evaluations of experience. The first is that unpleasant experiences are viewed as less fair than pleasant experiences. Secondly, situations seem less fair when others, rather than oneself, are in control. Although hate is often missing from research on emotion (even when other strong emotions are considered), the psychological literature explores emotion and links it with identity, cognition, context, and the unconscious in interesting ways.

### *Cognitions*

Cognitive research on how we process information, make decisions, and solve problems (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) is relevant to hate. This includes work on attitudes, schemas, attribution, social identities, and social representations that are integrated in studies of stereotype, prejudice, and intergroup attribution (Augoustinos and Walker, 1998). Cognitive research is not limited to the individual mind, but is attentive to the broader social context in its investigation of social, structural, and discourse analyses. Individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, and ideas are shaped within an influential and shared social reality (Deaux and Philogène, 2001; Moscovici, 1981). Research on cognitions is attentive to all levels of analysis, from the internal to the superordinate groups, as exemplified by its measurement tools, such as the IAT measures of lag time between associating words (Greenwald, 1992; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Greenwald *et al.*, 1998), to the measurement of over-arching group identities (Dovidio and Gaertner, 1999).

Stereotypes are of particular relevance to hate. Although some stereotypes are benign categorizations (e.g., accountants, art students) that simplify information (Hamilton *et al.*, 1990), others have considerable “affective, symbolic, and political punch” (Augoustinos and Walker, 1998, p. 631; see also Allport, 1954). Negative stereotypes essentialize and vilify groups. Of particular relevance to justice research, some work in this area has been attentive to contextual and enabling cognitions that can rationalize an unjust *status quo* (Yzerbyt *et al.*, 1997) and produce bias and hate (e.g., Gerstenfeld, 2002). Although cognitive psychologists focus on the present,

they recognize that proximate social contexts are not the only variables that account for bias and hostility (Fiske, 2002).

### **Psychoanalytic Approaches**

The contribution of unconscious and irrational aspects of hate has been derived, in part, from decades of psychoanalytic scholarship. This work is attuned to prior material in individual's lives, much of which may remain unconscious. As psychoanalytic researcher Simon Clarke (1999) states, "recognition of the role of unconscious processes at work in society can unlock the missing elements in the explanation of ethnic hatred, addressing the affective power in racism and confronting the irrational forces which inform social action" (p. 23). Melanie Klein's (1930, 1932, 1935) seminal work on infancy describes how ephemeral memories and childhood experiences imbue adult evaluations of justice with particular meaning. As a psychoanalyst, she relied on emotional antecedents in patient self-reports as data to build a theory that described how unconscious memories precede and intrude upon later interpersonal relationships. Her elaboration of the illogical elements that are out of consciousness (but nevertheless underlie relationships) asks psychological researchers interested in hate to take seriously what came before, its effect on the unconscious, and its effect on subsequent relationships and behaviors.

Psychoanalytic models theorize hatred as manifestations of unconscious motivations in prejudice, violence, us/them dynamics, and international conflict. Samuel Kimbles's (2000) research on the pathological expression of us/them dynamics that have led to genocidal violence is one example. Fakhry Davids (2002) argues that the world's privileged people project their uncertainties and anxieties connected with ordinary human frailty onto excluded groups around the world; as a result, the lives of those who are degraded become less precious than our own. David Rothstein (1998) offers a psychoanalytic interpretation of the roots of violence and the role of expelling "the other" to achieve group cohesion. This samples an impressive body of psychoanalytic research on hate that argues for the importance of the irrational and illogical in understanding it. Importing these concepts into psychological and justice research offers ways to account for the intense emotional fierceness with which hate can emerge.

### **Criminal Justice**

In labeling hate crimes by their various "isms" we are reminded of hate's victims, but lose sight of its perpetrators. As Sullivan (1999) states:

The modern words that we have created to describe the varieties of hate: "sexism," "racism," "anti-Semitism," "homophobia" ... tell us merely the identities of the victims; they don't reveal the identities of the perpetrators, or what they think, or how they feel. (p. 54)

Criminal justice research on hate crime, however, closely studies hate's perpetrators and does so in applied and often violent contexts. This research does not address the psychology of interaction, assessment, or appraisal like justice, emotion, or cognitive research, but instead, utilizes crime statistics and demographic variables to develop typologies that delineate personal and group characteristics and motivators of hate crime. These typologies are designed to be useful to criminal justice practitioners who can predict who is drawn to specific kinds of hateful behavior and under what circumstances.

McDevitt *et al.* (2002), relying on a framework of bigotry (Levin and McDevitt, 1993), create a hate crime offender typology with four categories: thrill-seekers, those who see themselves as defending their turf, those with group biases, and those who seek retaliation. They also describe the social and contextual conditions that set each of these categories in motion. Bennett (1991) describes hate crime as resulting from three factors: proximity to potential victims, motivation to harm victims, and the number of potential perpetrators in the area to create a group-level behavior. Byers and Crider (2002) describe four factors that lead to bias crimes: perceived boredom, desire for excitement, lack of guardians, and perceived group difference.

These typologies are of interest to psychologists who study hate because they differentiate among hate crimes motivationally and behaviorally. Although Byers and Crider (2002) do not delve deeply into internal dynamics, their use of the word "thrilling" suggests a perpetrator's strong affect and desire to harm and hints at the underlying psychological complexity of hating. In Franklin's (2000) research on motivations for anti-gay violence, she finds that individuals with an anti-gay ideology, along with peer dynamics that included thrill-seeking and self-defense interests, are more likely to engage in anti-gay violence.

While differentiating among motivations is addressed in criminal justice research, the construct, *hate*, is taken at face value. When hate is included in self-report assessments on motivating ideologies (e.g., "I hate homosexuals" in Franklin, 2000), it is framed as an attitude. If hate is assumed to be an influential part of perpetrators' ideologies, it should be theorized more comprehensively. In contrast to psychoanalytic approaches to hate, criminal justice is attentive to the present and the immediate past, and is less concerned with distal origins and unconscious aspects of hate.

In the justice, psychological, psychoanalytic, and criminal justice literatures hate is primarily theorized at the individual level of analysis. In societies rife with violence, when hate is widespread and extreme (e.g., during

war, terrorism, or genocide), a psychology of the hateful and violent perpetrator should consider as its subject one who is simultaneously an individual, part of a group, and within a society (cf., Opotow, 2000). We propose backing away from various expressions of hate and their consequences for victims and, instead, examine the development, progression, and intensification of hate. This theory-building paper takes this approach in theorizing a psychology of hating from the perspective of the hater.

## EXAMPLES OF HATE

From what we've learned from justice, psychological, psychoanalytic, and criminal justice research, the study of hate needs to be attentive to five distinct components that work together to give rise to the perpetration of hate. Justice research emphasizes justice norms and morals; psychological research emphasizes cognition and emotion; psychoanalytic research emphasizes past experiences; and criminal justice research emphasizes the variety of motivations perpetrators experience prior to enacting hate crimes. Consistent with the dynamic quality of hate, we integrate these approaches and propose a dynamic theory that unfolds over time, is attentive to individual and larger levels of analysis, and delineates the relationship among antecedents, emotions, cognitions, morals, and behaviors suggested in the research on hate.

In the context of hate, the psychology of the hater has been elusive. Theorizing the perspective of the perpetrator of hate allows us to consider more carefully the variety of enabling conditions that precede and accompany the experience of hating.

We describe two brief examples to animate the components and their inter-relationships in theory we will propose. Both illustrate mild and severe hate, imagined and enacted hate, and hate at different levels of analysis. Together, they share contexts in which hate flourishes: homophobia, racism, religious intolerance, and ethnocentrism.

### Stormfront

The Anti-Defamation League (2005) describes Stormfront as "one of the first hate sites on the Internet." On the Stormfront website ([www.stormfront.org](http://www.stormfront.org)) the discourse of hate can be observed within discussions categorized by various topics relating to white supremacy. A post from a Stormfront community member highlights the nature of hating:

Now, let's address Hatred. The forced and unwelcomed imposition of non-Whites in our indigenous White homelands is racist against Whites. Their relentless quest to force feed us their cultures, while trying to undermine ours is selfish and

hateful. This alone clearly illustrates [sic] who the racists are. Additionally, the egalitarians who are trying to deny us these basic human rights are the epitome of hypocrisy, double standards, hatred and the true architects [sic] of racism. (<http://www.stormfront.org/archive/t-207908Hate.html>, 2005)

In this hate website we see the building of community based on righteous victimhood. Historical events, the sense of having been invaded, and threats from blurring of group boundaries have resulted in threats to a cherished personal and group identity and expectations about the way things should be. In contrast to the purity of motive professed by the writer, non-white people are portrayed as selfish, racist, hateful, and clearly outside of this Stormfront member's moral community. As another member of the Stormfront community states, "To (at least me) most of us, mankind is US. We are mankind" (<http://www.stormfront.org/archive/t-207908Hate.html>, 2005). In this quote, we see enforcement of a particular "we;" the comment obliterates those who are not included in "mankind," and draws an explicit boundary between those who are inside and outside the scope of justice.

Moral communities tend to be conceptualized as benign and are a kind of holding environment (Winnicott, 1965)—a safe space for shared morals, valuations, actions, coordination, and support. Stormfront illustrates that moral communities vary in the morality they espouse. In a moral community such as Stormfront, a non-penitent perpetrator of hate may be encouraged and even revered.

## Iraq

In a second example, hate is acted upon. As we write this paper, conflict between Shi'ites and Sunni Moslems in Iraq has inflamed sectarian violence throughout the Mideast (Weisman, 2006) and has since escalated into civil war (Wong, 2006). Sectarian violence escalated sharply after Saddam Hussein's reign ended with a U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. In towns and cities where Sunnis and Shi'ites had lived side by side for decades, each group experienced increasing attacks on its religious and commercial sites. Threats, gangland-style killings, and bombings increased (Tavernise, 2006). Frightened families moved from their homes and many cities and towns in Iraq have become increasingly segregated and polarized.

This first quotation describes hate in early stages of the escalation of sectarian violence that preceded full-fledged war. It describes hate at the level of the individual, family, and community.

Complaining of abductions and threats against Shiites who make up only 10 per cent of the population at Khan Dhari, he [Majid Jabar Mozan, a Shiite mechanic] says it was time to go. "It was like living with the Mafia. People with masks were setting up checkpoints and abusing or killing people because they are Shiites. This is civil war—if we go back, we die." ...Shiite families straggling into Baghdad

report being ordered out of towns and hamlets by gunmen or by letters dropped at their doors in the dead of night. Like Majid, some bunk with relatives; others retreat to mosque-run shelters or keep going to the relative safety of the Shiite south. But Sunnis living in Shiite-dominated communities tell similar stories. The anarchic violence of the past 10 days has been reported as the start of a Shiite backlash to years of Sunni-backed insurgency provocation. (McGeough, 2006)

The second quotation describes civil war and hate at larger levels of analysis—large groups, nations, and between nations.

Many Sunnis, especially religious extremists, hate Shiites more than they hate Israel. Al Qaeda's basic credo puts the matter bluntly: "We believe that the Shiites are the most evil creatures under the heavens." Sectarian tension is woven into day-to-day life in a number of Gulf societies. It's a well-known fact that in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the Shiites, though a numerical majority, were second-class citizens. But few Americans know that a similar imbalance exists in Bahrain, where the Sunni-dominated state rules a society that is 75 percent Shiite. Next door in Saudi Arabia, the Shiites make up a much smaller percentage of the total population (10 to 15 percent), but they are concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province. This sectarian geography has prompted at least one prominent Saudi cleric to call for the "ethnic cleansing" of the Shiites. (Doran, 2004)

As intimidation, violence, bombings, and riots that emerge from the history and politics of Iraq become more common, individuals nested within religious groups, regions, and nation-states are increasingly ensnared in a conflict that emerges from and is fueled by fear, hatred, and beliefs about justice. Each side then views harm experienced by the other as deserved. We see a spiral dynamic in which historical antecedents—long ago and more recent—give way to violent events and fear at every level of analysis, which then changes the current social and political context and fuels civil war. This example alludes to the psychological, cultural, political, historical, and geographical factors that form and support moral communities.

We segue from these powerful examples to a theory of hating. It emphasizes the mix of factors influencing hate's inception and expression: antecedents—mediated by cognitions, morals, and affect—result in hateful behaviors.

## THE INTENSIFICATION THEORY OF HATING

In brief, our theory describes hating as follows: Hate emerges from antecedents prior to the experience of hate, some proximate contextual factors, and some unconscious or irrational beliefs. These antecedents create a readiness to hate. Subsequently, hate emerges as a negative form of affect, dependent on the availability of social categories, particularly derogated social groups, and on moral justifications.

This theory, intended to stimulate research, is designed to create a conceptually coherent representation that closely matches the experience of hating for its perpetrators. In addition to examining the cognitive, affective,

and moral aspects of hate, it also integrates psychoanalytic approaches that go back in time to understand the antecedent and unconscious origins of hate (Riviere, 1964). It asks researchers to consider what came before hate, both in terms of historical, imagined, and unconscious factors. The following schematic representation depicts this theory:

Here, we see hate as an affective response, intermingling with biases, beliefs, and external events, to produce hating and hateful behavior. This representation highlights hate’s dual role. It is an affect and it is also systemic when it interacts with other components and unfolds over time. In short, hate as an affect is one element of the psychology of hating represented in Fig. 1. Like Beck and Pretzer’s (2005) model of the cognitive-interpersonal cycles of hate, elements of our model interact over time and outcomes circle back to become antecedents—creating a spiral that connects the beginning and end points.

### Five Components of the Theory

Key elements of this theory are antecedents, affect, cognitions, morals, and behaviors. A later section discusses the interaction among the elements. This section describes each element of the theory of hating, referring back to three examples—the August 7th hate crimes, Stormfront, and Iraq—to illustrate each component.

#### *Antecedents*

Antecedents, as we define them in this theory, are events—real or imagined—in the lives of people as individuals or as members of groups that affect a hater’s world view. At the individual level, antecedents include experiences and unconscious aspects of an individual’s past that can persist in memories and irrational thinking. At the group level, antecedents can be shared histories and events with meaning for individuals and groups such as natural disasters and wars. Stories and myths that emerge from these events




Fig. 1. The Intensification Theory of Hating.

can persist in individual or shared stereotypes, expectancies, and fears. As Maurice Halbwachs writes in *The Collective Memory*, “While the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember” (1980, p. 48). Because hate can be evoked by social issues of psychological concern, for example, experiences of interpersonal, intergroup, or mob violence, its genesis within individuals and groups should interest justice researchers.

Antecedents are a way of imagining and then studying the role of the past in current hate. In the August 7th hate crimes described at the start of this paper, and in the Stormfront and Iraq examples, hate refers back to distal events in a collective or personal history (e.g., wars, invasions, and migrations) or in the proximate context (e.g., feelings of threat, attack, vilification, and intimidation). Both distal and proximal events can be real, imagined, or a combination of these. We propose that antecedents seen as significant by individuals and groups create a predisposition to hate, but do not directly lead to hateful behaviors. They are mediated by affect, cognition, and morals.

### *Affect*

Hate can be understood in a number of ways: as a viscerally felt emotion, as readiness to act hatefully, as actions imbued with and informed by hate, and as an ideology or worldview. The theory places the first meaning, viscerally felt emotion, as one component in a larger system of hating that develops and persists in a systemic, dynamic, and developmental process.

Hate, the emotion, is often associated with related emotions, such as anger, fear, frustration, contempt, disgust, powerlessness, guilt, and envy, but remains distinct. Hate is often entwined with anger, but anger is generally a response to specific, personally felt offense, while hate can arise without offense (Gaylin, 2003; Post, 2005). Hate, the emotion, can wane, but the process of hate, as Primo Levi (1967) states, perpetuates itself as “a thirst for revenge” (p. 426). In the Stormfront and Iraq examples, anger, threat, fear, and hate intermingle. These two examples also illustrate the interaction among affect, cognitions, and moral beliefs in who is right and wrong, good and bad.

### *Cognitions*

Cognitions are the labels, categories, stereotypes, and social representations that can give rise to ingroup/outgroup dynamics. In the August 7th hate crime and Stormfront examples, we see how cognitions support grouping people into ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In the Iraq example, labeling people Sunnis or Shi’ites is fraught with meaning at the individual, interpersonal,

community, city, state, and international levels of analysis. The labels ultimately support the emergence and perpetuation of sectarian hatred and directs this hatred to particular groups of people.

### *Morals*

Morals are the norms, rights, entitlements, obligations, responsibilities, and duties that guide our behavior with others and shape our sense of fairness (Deutsch, 1982). Morals, conveyed by social learning and culture, distinguish right from wrong and good from bad in the actions of responsible beings, and are attuned to what we owe particular people in specific contexts. Morals are shaped by cultural expectancies about how particular people ought to behave in particular contexts. They are deeply felt, particularly when people perceive a discrepancy between what *should be* and what *is* (Lerner, 1980). Morals are fundamental to distributive, procedural, and inclusionary justice.

Perceived violations of shared social norms can activate a sense of danger and injustice that charges conflict with passion (Opatow, 2000). Morals can deter hate when they instruct perspective-taking, tolerance, and appreciation of differences, but morals can inflame hate when they supply the justifications for hating and hateful behaviors based on categorical differences. Coupled with cognitions, morals can give rise to extreme violence. In the August 7th hate crimes, Stormfront, and Iraq examples, assumptions about what is unacceptable and bad about others (e.g., they are inferior, selfish, wrong, violent, dangerous) justifies hating.

### *Behavior*

Hate, felt individually or shared, can be quiescent or it can be acted upon. Hate, acted upon, ranges from non-verbal indicators of contempt to physical expressions of violence. Hateful behavior can occur as mild or severe verbal and/or physical expression directed at individuals and/or groups by individuals or groups. Severity of hateful behaviors can range from rude, insulting behavior to mild physical injury (slaps, kicks), severe injury (weapons), torture, irreversible injuries, mutilation, and murder. Table I samples hateful behaviors.

The August 7th hate crimes, Stormfront, and Iraq, illustrate that hateful behaviors occur at every level of analysis, from one-on-one violence, to attacks by large groups, to coordinated violence sustained throughout a society as in genocide. Stormfront, an interactive website, gives voice to sustained hate. The website offers a venue for community members, linked

Table I. Hateful Behaviors

	Mild	Severe
Verbal	Communicate bigotry target and bystanders (e.g., speeches, hate graffiti) Harass and impugn targets	Use epithets and slurs to convey detestation without restraint Threaten targets (e.g., hate speech) Humiliate targets Describe targets as vermin, pests, the plague (e.g., hate radio and websites)
Physical	Convey hate without injuring people (e.g., vandalism) Use symbols (e.g., swastika, burning symbols) to intimidate targets	Attack, beat, injure, kill targets (e.g., hate crime, bias violence) Direct unrestrained harm at individuals and groups (e.g., mass violence, mutilation, and murder)

by a particular kind of hate, to publicize its message and to solicit new members. In the August 7th hate crimes, racial and homophobic slurs and physical violence expressed hate. In the hate crimes and Iraq, small and large groups enacted hate. In all three cases, hateful behavior was intended to enforce between-group segregation, protect *us*, and inflict harm on *them*.

## DISCUSSION: DYNAMICS OF HATING

The theory of hating we propose, attentive to antecedents, cognitions, morals, and affect, is an integrative way of understanding expressed hate at individual and categorical levels. As Donald Moss (2003) emphasizes, “when we hate—racistly, homophobically, misogynistically—we do not hate as isolated individuals. Rather, we hate as part of a group, not in the first person singular, but in the first person plural” (p. xviii). Racist hate, for example, expressed in any form—lynching or the refusal of a barber to cut an African American’s hair—inevitably merges the individual perpetrator with the real or imagined group.

In its reliance on justice, cognitive science, psychoanalysis, and developmental psychology, our theory of hating crosses a number of sub-disciplinary borders. It is interactional and bi-directional: hateful behaviors may become antecedents of subsequent hate in oneself and others. The essential connective tissue supplied by these five components brings the construct of hating directly into the field of justice. When hate is limited to one component (cognitions, for example) it can remain quiescent and is likely to wane (cf., Opatow, 2005). But when hate flows through the components of the theory, and from the individual to the group (and back again), it takes on a destructive life of its own.

### Interactions and the Affect-Cognition-Moral Swirl

Applying this theory of hating to our three examples—the August 7th hate crimes, Stormfront, and Iraq—illustrates how the theory’s three central components interact. We see an affect-moral-cognitive interaction in how a Stormfront community member reacts to what he or she sees as boundary blurring: “their relentless quest to force feed us their cultures, while trying to undermine ours.” In the Iraq example, we see that rigid boundaries emphasizing differences between Sunnis and Shi’ites are imbued with strong emotions—hate, fear, infuriation—that justify violent behavior. In each of these examples, attitudes, labels of right and wrong, and emotions collide in the development of hate.

We see this three-component “swirl” in hate crimes in the way that racism and sexism justify brutal responses. Stormfront’s enemy image of non-whites and egalitarians mixes group labels with justifications for excluding them from the scope of justice, expressed as anger at non-whites’ “relentless quest to force feed us their cultures.” In Iraq, religious differences between Shi’ites and Sunnis could be neutral; many groups differ religiously and live together in harmony. Instead, in Iraq, these differences are imbued with moral meaning and condemnation.

Affect, cognitions, and morals, acting together, intensify hate. They complicate simpler emotion-to-behavior theories of hate, but they nevertheless oversimplify the social reality. Describing a synergistic relationship among these three elements comes on the heels of a long history of trying to tease apart cognition and affect (Lazarus, 1982; Zajonc, 1984). However, when these two are joined with morals, an under-studied space opens up where individuals and groups make decisions about who is and is not deserving of justice. The interaction among affect-cognitions-morals unfolds as a set of perceptions, decisions, and rationalizations that ultimately result in behaviors that harm or do not harm. The synergy among affect, cognitions, and morals seats hating on this tripod of psychological structures. What each component contributes to hate is powerful and makes hate so complex and feared.

### The Larger Spiral

Antecedents provoke affect, cognitions, and morals. These, in turn, give rise to attitudes, intentions, and actual behaviors. Although there can be initial distal and proximal causes of hate from the perspective of the hater, the very expression of hate circles back to change the context—materially and psychologically—for the hater and victim. This can further intensify

affect, cognitions, morals, and behaviors, which are then replayed in a loop resulting in the build up of hate.

Opatow (2005) describes this process as a psychological *impasto*, technically the repeated applications that result in a thick, textured build up of paint in a painting. Hate, she argues, is also an *impasto*, developing from successive layerings. Our three examples sketch out this process: antecedents give rise to emotions, cognitions, morals, and behavior, which results in increasingly negative emotions, cognitions, and moral judgments, justifying increasing levels of hate. Emphasizing antecedents and temporality, Sullivan (1999) explains that, “just as sexual abusers have often been victims of sexual abuse, and wife-beaters often grew up in violent households, so hate criminals may often be members of hated groups” (p. 57). In Iraq, resentments from perceived favoritism during the Saddam Hussein era engendered inter-group hostility, which ultimately led to civil war throughout the region (Tavernise, 2006). These examples illustrate how hate persists over time, and as it does, targets of hate may themselves become perpetrators of hate.

### Micro and Macro Justice

In describing this theory of hating, we have moved between the individual and the group. It is difficult to tease apart these two levels of analysis because they are nested: individuals are nested with families, families within larger social groupings, and larger social groupings within religions, castes, and nation-states. In their work on microjustice and macrojustice, Brickman *et al.* (1981) observed that:

microjustice theorizing is unlikely to be sufficient for understanding what happens when there are struggles, among large populations who do not interact directly, over resources that cannot be easily assigned to any of them on an individual basis. (p. 178)

To see and understand the implications of hate requires remaining attentive to these two levels—the individual and the group—in spite of its artificiality and the real difficulties of doing so. Fixating on the individual in the field or in the lab cannot adequately explain how hate jumps levels of analysis, from the individual to larger units, and how the group influences the thinking and behavior of individuals. To understand and study the volatility of hating, both interpersonal and categorical hatred must be accounted for. Collectively experienced hate depends on having hated targets who have been identified as outside the scope of justice. And hate, directed at an entire social group, can become extraordinarily destructive, as genocidal wars illustrate (for example, in Rwanda, see:

Dallaire and Beardsley, 2003; Gourevitch, 1998; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 1999).

## CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON HATING

Practically speaking, how can a researcher study hate using The Intensification Theory of Hating as guidance? We begin with six guidelines, followed by five brief and provocative examples of research designs and questions that illustrate how research in this area could proceed.

### Six Guidelines

- (1) First, think across levels of analysis. How are individuals simultaneously members of multiple groups and how do these social identities converge in assessments of hate?
- (2) Second, identify possible antecedents of hate for individuals and groups. These antecedents can have occurred in the distant or recent past and they can include longstanding fears, myths, and past events.
- (3) Third, assess potential unconscious or irrational antecedents of hating. Measures of unconscious material include verbal projective tests, such as sentence completion tasks, and more structured indirect measurement methods such as the Implicit Association Test (Nosek *et al.*, 2005), and the PANAS scale (Watson *et al.*, 1988).
- (4) Fourth, seek to avoid social desirability in responses. Methods such as the randomized response techniques can aid in the study of undesirable behaviors like hate because research participants are more likely to admit to socially undesirable behavior with this approach (Kidder and Judd, 1986).
- (5) Fifth, assess research designs for the potential of bi-directionality between independent variables and dependent variables. When do consequences become causal agents?
- (6) Sixth, as our three examples suggest, research scenarios can utilize distilled analogues based on actual scenarios of hate. Archival material available in journalists' reports, interviews with perpetrators, and trial transcripts can yield experimental material to study hating.

### Provocative Examples

We have selected several provocative studies that we see as having potential to inspire innovative research on hating.

#### *John Darley and the Vietnam War*

John Darley (1999) provides an historical example illustrating one way to imagine a research program that takes a complex theory of hating into account. With hindsight as a guide, he suggests a potential study that could have occurred within the context of the Vietnam War. He offers the suggestion that psychologists could have measured the facilitated associations and semantic shifts of a United States soldier to the word “gook” (p. 272) as the soldier moved from basic training to actual combat in Vietnam. Observing semantic mappings of those who interact with hate (and may or may not experience hate themselves) could provide valuable insight into the mechanisms of hate at both micro- and macro-levels and would allow for a temporal analysis in contrast to more static research paradigms. Darley’s research suggestion takes levels of analysis into account as well as differentiates potential and real violence. He suggests an applied study that examines hate, as opposed to hate’s cousins, disagreement or conflict. This approach suggests the following research questions:

- What is the relationship between “little” and “big” hate?
- How are people influenced when hate is part of prevailing attitudes?
- How does a person move from attitudinal hate to a willingness to act out hate?

#### *Susan Fiske and the brain*

Hate, as a complex construct, calls for researchers to cross sub-disciplinary borders either by working with collaborators or by utilizing multiple methods in their work. Doing so can enable the development of more detailed and explanatory theories. Fiske (2002) describes future research on bias that takes this cross-disciplinary approach:

Promising lines of research range from imagining brain activity beyond the amygdala, to specifying intergroup emotions beyond mere antipathy, to explaining stereotype content beyond mere lists of negative traits to predicting discrimination in all its guises, to assessing people’s control over their own seemingly automatic reactions. (p. 128)

This research approach considers intrapersonal and interpersonal measures and suggests research questions:

- Are there reliable physiological measures of hate in indicators such as blood pressure (e.g., Suarez *et al.*, 2004) or retinal excitation (e.g., Zajonc, 1984)?
- What is the experience of hate from the perspective of both the perpetrator and target? Can this be measured neurologically, physiologically (e.g., blood pressure and other physiological measures), as well as in self-report and interviews with parties who hate and are hated?

#### *Niza Yanay and Hate Letters*

Niza Yanay (1995, 1996, 2002) coded 200 letters sent to targets of hate (Tempkin and Yanay, 1989) to look at strategies perpetrators used to express themselves and admonish their objects of hatred. In this research, Tempkin and Yanay found that the haters commonly wrote about their desire to exclude the members of the Israeli Zionist party from the larger collective of Israel and Jewish identity all together. “In the eyes of the haters (mostly religious men), the members of the [Zionist party] were perceived, at the same time, as part of the collective and as enemies, both insiders and outsiders, i.e., Jewish but anti-religious, Zionist yet pro-Palestinian” (Yanay, 2002, pp. 55–56). This dynamic of fluidity around the borders of moral communities suggests a rich set of data on the dynamics of hating. Yanay’s work poses a number of research questions:

- How does hating within small groups get reproduced in large groups?
- How does anonymity support hate?
- Would self-awareness deter hate?

#### *Else Frenkel-Brunswick and Anti-Semitism*

In her contribution to *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno *et al.*, 1950), Else Frenkel-Brunswick (1950) looked to recollections of family interactions in order to study the link between childhood memories and later hatred of minorities. Prompted by the Holocaust, anti-Semitism, along with a constellation of other anti-minority sentiments, was seen as part of a “potentially fascist” character. Frenkel-Brunswick and her colleagues hypothesized that this personality structure could be traced back to early

family experiences, particularly experiences of feeling frustrated and overly disciplined as a child. She used clinical interviews and questionnaires to study the potential links between an individual's past experiences of feeling dominated with their current desire to dominate another. Frenkel-Brunswick's research moves from micro-level (individual) antecedents to macro-level (group) behaviors, and it connects unconscious antecedents with later hatred and prejudice. These antecedents are not theorized as remaining simply in the individual mind, but as residing within individuals and in groups. It is because both can co-exist simultaneously that the potential for immense destruction becomes possible. Frenkel-Brunswick's research directs our attention to methodologies that assess the unconscious as an antecedent of future hating. Researchers from various disciplines could benefit from asking questions that Frenkel-Brunswick's work raises, such as:

- How can research methodologies get beyond taking the individual at face value, and instead, get at unconscious or unobservable responses?
- Are there ways that data can be gathered about persons or groups who are real, (mis)remembered, or imagined?

#### *Susan Opotow and Teen vs. Genocidal Hate*

To explore the breadth of the construct, hate, Susan Opotow (2005) compared mild hate that youths expressed in interviews about their interpersonal conflicts with peers with severe hate expressed on hate radio in Rwanda in 1994. She found that mild hate differed from severe hate in a number of ways. Mild hate focused on the specific (person, action) rather than a larger group and efforts were made to minimize hate rather than obsess about it. Youth allowed their hate to ebb. Hate radio continually incited hate, identified its target as categorical, and promoted increasingly greater violence. This work poses a number of research questions:

- When and how does hate lose momentum? What cognitive and moral mechanisms de-escalate severe hate?
- Can mechanisms that reduce hate in individuals be applied in violent contexts?

In sum, there are a number of complex and interesting ways that hate is being studied. What has been lacking was an integrative psychological theory of hating. By proposing the theory and incorporating the components and designs of prior research, we hope to guide those who want to study hating. We are cognizant of the obstacles that will be faced by researchers. It is not simply a matter of invoking hate in a representative

sample and observing the mechanisms and outcomes. Therefore, we have turned to a number of researchers to demonstrate various methodological approaches to studying hate.

While laboratory-based research offers causal clarity, it can limit our understanding of hating. For constructs that unfold over time, are rooted in personal and social history, and are embedded in conflictual social contexts, a more dynamic approach is needed that can capture bidirectional arrows and spirals in social dynamics that are affected by and affect others. This is particularly important in studies concerning the psychological response in situations of intense arousal: perceived danger, threat, and conflict (cf., Hegtvedt, 2005). Research that crosses levels of analysis and periods of time for individuals as they act against others would benefit from methodological approaches that combine the precision of the lab and its focus on individuals with qualitative, observational, archival/historical, and other methodologies. Inquiries are needed that seek to understand how individual lives, viewed through the prism of psychological constructs such as emotions, morals, and values (articulated or not), and social knowledge (conscious or not), become aroused in situations of threat. These inquiries can help to determine how participants imagine and subsequently behave hatefully toward other people, alone or in concert with others.

### Suggestions for Future Research

When we consider the theory critically, we see a number of fascinating questions that remain. First, our theory places motives of hating within the antecedent component. In the interests of parsimony we have not elaborated the role of motives, but it could be useful to do so. Second, there have been complex discussions in the literature concerning the particular ways that affect and cognition are imagined in relationship to one another (Lazarus, 1981, 1982, 1984; Reizenzein and Schönplflug, 1992; Zajonc, 1980; 1984). Hating could be a productive context to explore this relationship further. Third, place and culture could play an influential role in hate but are outside mainstream social psychology. Their influence could be explored in further multi-subdisciplinary work (cf., Mikula *et al.*, 1998). Fourth, hate has a body language, a kinesthetic quality in facial and bodily expressions that could be elaborated in future research. Fifth, our theory examined perpetrator hatred, but hate can be bidirectional and well as unidirectional. Power relationships that play a role in the expression of hate could be explored further. Sixth, the relationship of fear to hate could be specified: When does perceived hate become mutual hate? In terrorism, when and how does “Why do they hate us?” become “We hate them”?

The theory of hate we propose challenges researchers concerned with justice to examine hate as it emerges and takes shape in human relationships in different social contexts and at different levels of analysis. Our three examples—the August 7th hate crimes, Stormfront, and Iraq—suggest that the theory is applicable to varied expressions of hatred. Its application to other violent contexts could test it further.

## CONCLUSION

This paper has proposed a theory of hating that delineates the complex, bidirectional, and circular dynamics of hating while remaining relatively parsimonious. It can be applied in multiple contexts from community to international hate, across micro- and macro-levels of analysis, to various “isms” (e.g., racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, and religious intolerance), to acute and chronic hate, and to mild and severe hate. In addition to studying overt hate, it could also explore covert hate, for example, when misogyny is a deeply held, unarticulated position that is intermittently expressed in cruelty and sadism toward women. It is our hope that this theory can serve as a roadmap to guide research.

We began this paper with a description of two hate crimes. We ask, how does a crime like this originate? What causes people to feel hate, nourish their hate, and then enact their hate in psychologically and physically harmful ways? Questioning the genesis, persistence, and expression of hate is timely as terrorism has become increasingly prevalent in the language of conflict.

Stepping back from our three examples and considering our integrated psychological theory in broader social contexts, we see opportunities for contributions for theory and practice. In an effort to develop a more comprehensive construct of hate, our theory delineates the relationship among its components. Each component has its own body of research within and outside of social psychology, but placing each next to the others in the context of hate can guide the further development and refinements of theory. These components belong together if we want to address a construct of this complexity. This theory of hating can increase theoretical clarity and has the potential to reduce error that results from less sophisticated and narrower research approaches. This theory remains attentive to multiple levels of analysis and how they contribute to the genesis of hate, within the individual, the group, and contexts in which individuals and groups live (Hegtvedt, 2005).

The Intensification Theory of Hating explains and organizes an important social phenomenon, one that is very much a part of historical and contemporary social living. Hate, as we have noted, is a construct that has

been under-theorized in psychology. Possibly because it is slippery or because it is inherently repellent, hate has not been well studied by the social psychological sub-disciplines—*affect*, interpersonal and intergroup relations, development, cognitions, justice—that could claim it.

For practice, the theory delineates decisions and steps taken by a person or group that hates. This can guide future research by proposing the steps that can be followed in studying as well as deterring hate. Practice includes addressing hate as an expert or as a member of communities, organizations, or political and religious groups. When theory and practice inform one another, a Lewinian ideal (Lewin, 1935), deviations from theoretical expectancies can propose ways to refine theory further. The multi-disciplinarity of our theory urges creative collaborations among researchers as well as between researchers and practitioners to devise new ways to study hate, new theories of hate, and new interventions to address hate.

Justice research has considered the contingencies—*what*, *how*, and *who*—in distributive, procedural, and inclusionary justice. These epistemological steps signify increasing attention to the contingencies of injustice. We propose also asking *why*—why injustice occurs. A study of justice may rest on an implicit foundation of hate. We urge consideration of the formation, perpetuation, and expression of this influential emotional state, an “inexhaustible font of evil” (Levi, 1967, p. 426), to provide a fuller analysis hate and hating from the perspective of its perpetrators.

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